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Abstract 
Research in distributed artificial intelligence (DAI) is concerned with how automated agents can 
be designed to interact effectively. Negotiation is proposed as a means for agents to communicate 
and compromise to reach mutually beneficial agreements. The paper examines the problems 
of resource allocation and task distribution among autonomous agents which can benefit from 
sharing a common resource or distributing a set of common tasks. We propose a strategic model 
of negotiation that takes the passage of time during the negotiation process itself into account. 
A distributed negotiation mechanism is introduced that is simple, efficient, stable, and flexible in 
various situations. The model considers ituations characterized by complete as well as incomplete 
information, and ones in which some agents lose over time while others gain over time. Using this 
negotiation mechanism autonomous agents have simple and stable negotiation strategies that result 
in efficient agreements without delays even when there are dynamic changes in the environment. 
1. Introduction 
Research in distributed artificial intelligence (DAI) is concerned with how automated 
agents can be designed to interact effectively. One important capability that could aid 
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inter-agent cooperation is negotiation; agents could be built that are able to communicate 
their respective desires and compromise to reach mutually beneficial agreements. 
One of the presumed difficulties in using negotiation as a way of reaching mutual 
benefit is that negotiation is a costly and time-consuming process and, consequently, it 
may increase the overhead of coordination (see [ 1 ] ) . In the presence of time constraints, 
planning and negotiation time should be taken into consideration. The negotiation may 
be either about job sharing or resource allocation. In both cases we want to prevent the 
agents from spending too much time on negotiation and therefore not keeping to their 
timetables for satisfying their goals. 
Research in DA1 is divided into two basic classes: Distributed Problem Solving (DPS) 
and Multi-Agent Systems (MA) [ 1 ] (see discussion of previous work in DA1 in Section 
1.5 below). Research in DPS considers how the work involved in solving a particular 
problem can be divided among a number of modules or “nodes”. The modules in a DPS 
system are centrally designed to improve performance, stability, modularity, and/or 
reliability. They include the development of cooperation mechanisms designed to find a 
solution to a given problem. 
Research in MA is concerned with coordinating intelligent behavior among a collec- 
tion of autonomous (possibly heterogeneous) intelligent (possibly pre-existing) agents. 
In MA, there is no global control, no globally consistent knowledge, and no globally 
shared goals or success criteria. There is a possibility for real competition among the 
agents. 
These classes are actually the two extreme poles in the DA1 research spectrum. Our 
research falls “closer” to the MA pole since it deals with interactions among self- 
motivated, rational and autonomous agents. However, we also deal with the possibility 
that the agents may share a common goal, although even in such situations, the agents 
are self-motivated and act only according to their interests. We assume that each agent 
has its own utility function, and that rational behavior involves maximizing expected 
utility. 
We examine the problems of resource allocation and task distribution among au- 
tonomous agents. In some domains, agents, due to limited resources must share a 
common resource (e.g., roads, bridges, clean air). In other domains, when resources 
are unlimited, agents may still mutually benefit from sharing a common resource since 
resources may be expensive (e.g., printers, satellites), or from distributing a set of com- 
mon tasks. Both problems (resource sharing and task distribution) are symmetrical. In 
the resource sharing problem there is competition for a valuable resource, with each 
agent seeking a larger share of the resource. In the task distribution problem where 
agents have a common goal, several tasks need to be performed to fulfill the goal. Each 
agent would like the common goal to be achieved with the least amount of effort on its 
part. This cooperative case also has a competitive element. Each agent wants to perform 
a smaller part of the job (task). 
In this paper we suggest a strategic model of negotiation that takes the passage of 
time during the negotiation process itself into consideration. Changes in the agents’ 
preferences over time will change their strategies in the negotiation and, as a result, 
the agreements they are willing to reach. This model will show that delays in reaching 
agreements can be avoided. We will examine the following possible situations where the 
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(1, 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
Two agents that lose over time need to share a common resource. Each agent 
knows all relevant information about the other agent. They have no alternative, 
but to continue the negotiations until an agreement is reached (Section 3). 
Two agents that lose over time need to cooperate to satisfy a common goal. 
Each agent knows all relevant information about the other agent. The agents can 
unilaterally leave the negotiations (Section 4). 
Two agents need to share a resource. One of the agents already has access to the 
resource and is using it during the negotiation process. It is gaining over time. 
The other agent is waiting to use the resource and loses over time. Both agents 
have full information and can unilaterally leave the negotiations (Section 5). 
Similar to case (3)) but the agents do not have complete information about each 
other (Section 6). 
Several agents need to cooperate to satisfy a common goal. All of them are losing 
over time, have full information about each other and can unilaterally leave the 
negotiations (Section 7). 
1.1. The resource allocation problem 
A set of agents shares a joint resource. The joint resource can only be used by one 
agent at a time. Agreement is sought so that all the agents will be able to use the 
resource. An agreement is a schedule that divides the usage of the resource among the 
agents. 4 
Examples of joint resources are: communication lines, printers, disks, bridges, road 
junctions, fresh water, clean air, etc. (Other work in the DAI community dealing with the 
resource allocation problem includes, for example, [ 6,301 which present a multistage 
negotiation protocol that is useful for cooperatively resolving resource allocation conflicts 
arising in distributed networks of semi-autonomous problem solving nodes. Lesser et al. 
[ 331 address tradeoff in resource allocation and real-time performance, and develop a 
mechanism for resource allocation based on the criticality of tasks; Kornfeld and Hewitt 
[ 231 propose resource allocation using specialist “sponsor” agents; and Chandrasekan 
[ 41 proposes resource allocation via resource pricing.) 
A communications satellite is a good example of a shared resource, due to the high 
cost of its launching and maintenance. In many cases the only way a company can 
get access to a communications satellite is by sharing one with other companies. Even 
competing companies may find it mutually beneficial to participate in such a joint 
project. 
Sharing a common resource requires a coordination mechanism that will manage the 
usage of the resource. Discussion about the coordination mechanism will begin (and 
may even conclude) before discussion of other technical aspects of the joint project. 
A coordination mechanism can be a static division of frequencies or time slots. On 
the other hand, it can be an on-line negotiation mechanism that dynamically resolves 
40ur model is also applicable in the case where the resource itself can actually be divided between the 
agents. This case does not differ significantly from the case where only the resource usage time can be divided. 
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local conflicts over the usage of the common resource. These are the two extreme poles 
of the coordination mechanism spectrum. On this spectrum there are also coordina- 
tion mechanisms that generate agreements on long term (an hour, a day, . . .) global 
schedules. 
This paper addresses the kinds of attributes a coordination mechanism should have 
and presents a negotiation mechanism that satisfies those attributes. An important at- 
tribute is eficiency. The coordination mechanism should result in an efficient joint 
usage of the common resource. Efficiency implies other attributes such as simplicity and 
instantaneously (i.e., a local conflict should be resolved without delay). 
As in the case of the communications satellite, common resources are shared by 
different companies with possibly different and even conflicting goals. Therefore, to 
ensure efficiency, the mechanism should also be stable and symmetric. This paper 
formally defines those attributes (Section 1.3) and presents symmetric, stable and simple 
on-line coordination mechanisms that resolve local conflicts without delay and result in 
an efficient joint usage of the resource. There is some cost associated with the time 
that elapses between the time that the resource is needed by an agent and the time the 
agent actually gains access to the resource. This cost depends on the internal state of 
the agent. For example, its task load, its disk space, etc. 
1.2. The task distribution problem 
A set of autonomous agents has a common goal it wants to satisfy as soon as possible. 
In order to satisfy any goal, costly actions must be taken and an agent cannot satisfy the 
goal without reaching an agreement with the other agents. Each of the agents wants to 
minimize its costs, i.e., prefers to do as little as possible. We note that even though the 
agents have the same goal (under our simplified assumptions), there is actually a conflict 
of interests. The agents try to reach an agreement over the division of labor. We assume 
that each step of the negotiation takes time, and the agents have preferences for reaching 
agreements in different time periods (research on the task distribution problem in the 
area of Distributed Problem Solving systems includes, for example, Davis and Smith’s 
work on the Contract Net [ 541, Cammarata et al.‘s work on strategies of cooperation 
that are needed for groups to solve shared tasks effectively in the context of collision 
avoidance in air traffic [2], Lesser and Erman’s model of a distributed interpretation 
system that is able to function effectively even though processing nodes have inconsistent 
and incomplete information [ 321, and Carver et al.‘s work on agents with sophisticated 
models that support complex and dynamic interactions between the agents [ 31). 
An example of task distribution is the “delivery domain” [ l-5,49,60,64]. A group of 
delivery companies can reduce their overall and individual delivery costs by coordinating 
their deliveries. Each delivery requirement is a single task. Delivery coordination is 
actually the exchanging of tasks. One company, for example, that needs to make a 
delivery from A to B and a delivery from C to D can execute other deliveries from A 
to B with no extra cost. Therefore, it may agree to exchange its C-to-D delivery with 
another A-to-B delivery. The mechanisms presented in this paper allow multiple delivery 
companies to reach an efficient agreement on task distribution without delay that will 
be mutually beneficial. 
S. Kraus et al./Artijcial Intelligence 75 (1995) 297-345 301 
1.3. Criteria for evaluation of negotiation protocols 
In a multi-agent competition situation there is a need to define a mechanism (a pro- 
tocol) that allows agents to resolve their conflicts and to reach a cooperative agreement. 
Those mechanisms are usually called negotiation protocols. 
Given a multi-agent domain, we are interested in investigating both the negotiation 
protocols that are available to the agents, and also the agent’s behavior (negotiation 
strategy) that is suitable for a given protocol. We will present the optimal strategy an 
agent should follow in a given protocol, and show that in the design of agents, there 
should be no reason to adopt any other strategy. 
What are the conditions that a Negotiation Protocol should satisfy (for any specific 
distributed multi-agent domain), such that it should be accepted by all the designers of 
agents (for that specific domain)? 
l Distributed. The decision making process should be distributed. There should be 
no central unit or agent that is managing the process. 
l Instantaneously. Conflict should be resolved without delay. 
l Eficiency. The outcome of the negotiations (i.e., the agreements) should be effi- 
cient: 
- Conflict should be avoided when possible and the mechanism should allow the 
agents to reach Pareto-optimal greements with high probability. An agreement 
is Pareto-optimal if there is no other agreement that dominates it, i.e., there is 
no other deal that is better for some of the agents and not worse for the others. 
- In the resource allocation problem, the resource is not in use only when there is 
no agent in the group that currently needs the resource (there are no deadlocks). 
l Simplicity. The negotiation process itself should be simple and efficient. It should 
be short and consume only a reasonable amount of communication and computation 
resources. 
l Symmetry. The coordination mechanism should not treat agents differently because 
of non-relevant attributes. In the situations that we consider, the agents’ utility 
functions and their role in the encounter are the relevant attributes. All other 
attributes, like an agent’s color, name or manufacture are not relevant. That is, 
symmetry implies that given a specific situation, the replacement of an agent with 
another which is identical with respect to the above attributes, will not change the 
outcome of the negotiation. 
l Stability. There should be a distinguishable (Nash or even subgame-perfect) equi- 
librium point to the negotiation protocol (considered as a game). 5 Given a specific 
situation, we would like to be able to find simple strategies that we could recom- 
mend to all agent designers to build into their agents. No designer will benefit by 
building agents that use any other strategy. The equilibrium point should not vio- 
late the efficiency condition, i.e., the negotiation should result in a Pareto-optimal 
agreement. Being a “simple strategy” means that it is feasible to build it into an 
5 For additional discussion of the concepts of Nash and subgame-perfect equilibrium, and Pareto-optimality, 
see Sections I .5 and 2. I below. 
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The rows indicate Degree of control on the “social Layer”; the columns indicate degree of control on other 
agents in the domain 
Structured Unstructured 
DPS 
Moses, Shoham & Tennenholtz [ 38,53 1, 
Davis & Smith [54], Malone 1371, 
Lesser [5,31], Durfee [I I, 121, 
MA 
Zlotkin & Rosenschein [ 45.6 1,641, 
Wellman [ 601, Ephrati & Rosenschein [ 131, 
Kraus, Wilkenfeld & Zlotkin 
Sycara [57,58], Kraus & Lehmann 124,251, 
Grosz ] 19,341, Gasser 1171 
0 
1.4. 
automated agent. A “simple strategy” also presumes that an agent will be able to 
compute the strategy in a reasonable amount of time. 
Sutisfiabifity or accessibility. In the resource allocation case we would like an 
agent that needs the resource to eventually have access to the resource (there is no 
starvation). In the task distribution case, we would like the task to eventually be 
performed. 
Related work in DA1 
The study of multi-agent interaction has been receiving increasing attention within ar- 
tificial intelligence (AI). This is a direct outgrowth of the serious consideration currently 
being given to agents operating in challenging, real-world environments. For many years, 
highly restricted domains were considered sufficient for AI research purposes, and agents 
such as Shakey [ 141 could be designed and built for operation in simplified, restricted 
environments. 
The research on agent architectures and on planning typically made several standard 
assumptions, including the existence of a static domain, the lack of deadlines, and the 
existence of a single agent, i.e., our agent. Once researchers began, for a variety of 
reasons, to move into realistic domains, these assumptions had to be quickly discarded. 
The research in planning and agent architectures of the last decade has been focused 
precisely on the transformation of single-agent, atemporal, static theories into multi- 
agent, temporal, dynamically capable ones. 
Researchers on agent interaction differ over the basic assumption of the degree of 
control that the designer has over individual agents and over their social environment 
(i.e., interaction mechanisms). Therefore, we can make a two-dimensional classification 
(see Table 1) . On the first dimension we have the degree of control over the social 
layer of the agents. It ranges from a highly structured interaction mechanism to a totally 
unstructured interaction. 
On the second dimension we have the degree of control that a designer has over 
individual agents. It ranges from the case where a single designer is able to control (or 
even explicitly design) each individual agent in the domain [those systems are known 
as Distributed Problem Solving (DPS)), to the case where there are multiple designers 
and each is able to design only its agent and has no control over the internal design of 
other agents in the domain (those systems are known as Multi-Agent system (MA)). 
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The second dimension is also tightly coupled to the issue of agents’ incentives. When 
agents are assumed to be centrally designed they are also assumed to have a common 
general goal. In such cases each agent tries to maximize some system global utility. 
When agents are designed by different designers, they are usually assumed to have 
individual motivation to achieve their own goal and to maximize their own utility. 
In the upper left corner of our two-dimensional matrix (i.e., designer can fully control 
each individual agent and also the interaction environment) we find the work of Shoham, 
Tennenholtz and Moses on social laws [ 38,531 which shows that “pre-compiled” highly 
structured “social laws” are able to coordinate agent activity and to restrict on-line 
conflict. Agents are assumed to follow the “social laws” since they were designed to 
and not because they individually benefit from the “social laws”. The same approach 
could have been applied in an MA system in the case were the social laws are “stable”, 
i.e., it is in each agent’s individual interest to follow the law. In our research we assume 
that the agents are individually motivated and therefore the issue of stability plays an 
important role in the design of the interaction mechanism. 
Even in DPS systems it may be useful to incorporate pure competition among the 
agents. Davis and Smith’s work on the Contract Net [54] introduced a form of simple 
negotiation among cooperative agents, with one agent announcing the availability of tasks 
and awarding them to other bidding agents. Malone refined this technique considerably 
by overlaying it with a more sophisticated economic model [37], proving optimality 
under certain conditions. In the general contract net approach and also in the economic- 
oriented refinements the main underlying assumption is that agents are “benevolent” and 
are motivated to help each other. Such an assumption is not feasible when agents are 
self-motivated. 
Another more experimentally based approach for inter-agent collaboration in DPS 
is presented in the on-going research of Lesser, Durfee and their colleagues using 
the “Functionally Accurate, Cooperative, (FA/C)” paradigm. For example the “Par- 
tial Global Planning” architecture has been implemented and evaluated in the vehicle 
monitoring domain (DVMT) [ 7,11,12]. The agents iteratively exchange tentative par- 
tial solutions to construct global solutions. Multi-agent planning in the communication 
network domain was treated as a distributed constraint on satisfaction and was imple- 
mented by using a multi-stage negotiation [5]. The multi-stage negotiation provides 
each agent sufficient information to enable it to make local decisions that are globally 
correct. These researchers approach the issue of global efficiency and performance more 
directly in real-world working systems, while we are analyzing the use of formal tools 
and general mechanisms in more idealized domains. 
We are unfamiliar with work that belongs to the upper right corner where the agents 
are centrally designed, but use unstructured communication protocols. This is, of course, 
due to the fact that since structured communication protocols usually provide more effi- 
cient cooperation, and if the designer has control over all the agents, it can incorporate a 
structured communication protocol in the agents to make the DPS system more efficient. 
In the lower right corner the designers have control only over their agents (i.e., no 
control over other agents or the interaction mechanism). This is usually the case in 
domains where humans are interacting with each other and with autonomous agents. 
For example, in the case of labor negotiation, Sycara [57,58] presented a model of 
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negotiation that combines case-based reasoning and optimization of multi-attribute util- 
ities. In her work agents try to influence the goals and intentions of their opponents. 
In 124,251 Kraus and Lehmann developed an automated Diplomacy player that nego- 
tiates and plays well in actual games against human players. Researchers in discourse 
understanding (e.g., [ 19,341 ) develop formal models to support communication i  
human/machine interaction. There, models of individual and shared plans are used for 
understanding non-structured communication. 
Gasser [ 171 focuses on the social aspects of agent knowledge and action in multi- 
agent systems (“communities of programs”), As in real-world societies, social mech- 
anisms can dynamically emerge. Communities of programs can generate, modify, and 
codify their own local languages of interaction. Gasser’s approach may be most effective 
when agents are interacting in unstructured domains, or in domains where their structure 
is continuously changing. In our research, we choose to pre-design the social layer of 
multi-agent systems by creating a structured interaction mechanism, i.e., a model of 
alternating offers. 
In most of the unstructured negotiation scenarios there is no guarantee that agreement 
will be reached, and the negotiation may take a long time. In the current work the 
negotiation always ends at the latest in the second stage of the negotiation and if there 
is complete information, agreement is guaranteed. 
The work we describe in the present paper, resides in the lower left corner. It assumes 
that there is full control over the agent interaction mechanism by bounding the agents to 
highly structured public behavior (like negotiation protocols, voting procedures, bidding 
mechanisms, etc.). However, as we mentioned in the introduction, our work is concerned 
with problems in developing agents in multi-agent systems. That is, there is no control 
over the other agent’s private behavior. This gap is bridged by carefully adjusting the 
interaction mechanism such that it will be stable. Using a stable mechanism, it is to the 
benefit of each individual agent (that wishes to maximize its own private utility) to adopt 
a given private behavior. When those private behaviors (strategies) are in equilibrium, 
then the designers of the interaction protocols can assume that the individual agents will 
be designed to have those private behaviors even though the protocols’ designers have 
no explicit control. 
Ephrati and Rosenschein [ 131 used the Clarke Tax voting procedure as a consensus 
mechanism. The mechanism assumes an explicit utility transferability (i.e., a kind of 
monetary system). In the problem of task distribution and resource allocation there is 
no explicit way to transfer utility. There is an implicit way to transfer utility, e.g., by 
executing one of your tasks I may transfer some utility I could have been getting to 
you. However, this implicit utility transfer is not sufficient for the implementation of the 
Clark Tax procedure. The Clark Tax mechanism assumes that agents are able to transfer 
utility out of the system (the taxes that are being paid by the agents). The utility that 
is transferred out of the system is actually wasted and reduces the efficiency of the 
consensus that is reached. This is the price that needs to be paid to ensure stability. 
In the paper we introduce a negotiation mechanism that provides both efficiency and 
stability. 
Zlotkin and Rosenschein [45,61,64] analyze the relationship between the attributes 
of the domain in which the agents are operating and the availability of interaction 
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mechanisms to satisfy the efficiency, simplicity, symmetry, and stability conditions. They 
have classified interaction domains as task-oriented domains, state-oriented domains and 
worth-oriented domains. In all of the above domains time plays no explicit role in the 
agent’s utility functions, It may be appropriate when negotiation time can be neglected 
relative to plan execution time. However, in highly dynamic systems, negotiation time 
plays an important role in the evaluation of the performance of the system and cannot 
be neglected. The approach presented in this paper focuses precisely on this kind of 
domain and provides coordination mechanisms that ensure efficient agreements with no 
delay. Within the MA/structured group of researchers it is the first attempt to treat the 
temporal aspect of negotiation explicitly. 
In this paper we consider the problem where agreements involve all the agents. 
Multi-agent’s negotiation mechanisms, in situations in which agents are free to form 
any coalition that includes some of the agents while excluding others, are discussed in 
[22,52,62]. 
Wellman [60] uses a market-oriented approach for inter-agent coordination mech- 
anism design (“market-oriented programming”). When the agent interaction can be 
reduced to a simple consumer-producer relation a market pricing mechanism can be 
used to ensure efficiency and stability. However, not all inter-agent interaction can be 
mapped to the consumer-producer paradigm. For example, in the case of a common 
resource (i.e., one of the encounters that are considered in the present approach), the 
whole community of agents are consumers. 
To summarize, our work is characterized by providing a formal strategic model of 
negotiation that takes the passage of time during the negotiation process itself into 
account. It can be used for both resource allocation and task distribution, without side 
payments. The only assumptions that we made is on the negotiation protocol, which is 
a protocol of alternating offers which we describe in detail in Section 3. However, we 
don’t make any assumptions about the offers the agents make during the negotiation as 
is the case in some other work (e.g., [63]). In particular, the agents are not bounded 
to any previous offers that have been made. Nevertheless, the negotiation ends with no 
delay. 
1.5. Related work in economics and game theory 
There are two main approaches to the development of theorems relating to the negoti- 
ation process. The first is informal theories which attempt to identify possible strategies 
for a negotiator and to assist a negotiator in achieving optimal results (see [ 10,16,21] ) . 
The other approach is the formal theory of bargaining originating with the work of John 
Nash [ 39,401, who attempted to construct formal models of negotiation environments 
and to prove different theorems about the best strategies a negotiator can follow under 
different circumstances. This formal game theory approach provides clear analyses of 
various situations and precise results concerning the strategy a negotiator should choose. 
However, it requires making restrictive assumptions that are unacceptable to the first 
group. 
Following Genesereth, Ginsberg, Rosenschein and Doyle, [ 8,9,18,44], we propose 
the use of game-theoretic techniques for artificial intelligence purposes. We propose to 
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develop a strategic model of negotiation that can serve as the basis for building efficient 
automated negotiators. The formal game theory approach is also divided into two central 
sub-approaches concerning the bargaining problem (see [ 201) . The first is the strategic 
approach. The agents’ negotiating maneuvers are moves in a noncooperative game and 
the rationality assumption is expressed by investigation of the Nash equilibrium. 6
The second approach is the axiomatic method. It makes assumptions about he solution 
of a negotiation situation without specifying the bargaining process itself (the literature 
on the axiomatic approach to bargaining is surveyed by Roth [46], and can also be 
found in [ 351 with a general introduction to game theory). 
Since we intend to use our theoretical work as a basis for the development of auto- 
mated negotiators, we have adopted the strategic approach. Rubinstein [47] and Stahl 
[ 561 developed models of alternating offers, which take time into consideration. Shaked 
and Sutton [51] extended these works by developing models in which an agent can opt 
out of the game. Those works are closely related to our desired models (see [ 411 for 
a detailed review of the bargaining ame of alternating offers). Nevertheless, everal 
important modifications are needed. These mainly concern the way time influences the 
preferences of the agents, the possibility that both agents can opt out, and the preferences 
of the agents over opting out. Only the results in Section 3.2 are based on Rubinstein’s 
previous work; all the other results are ours. 
2. lko fully informed agents 
In the next three sections we consider the case where two fully informed agents 
negotiate to reach agreement on resource allocation or on task distribution. 
These situations are characterized by the following assumptions. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Bilateral Negotiation. Even if there are several agents in the environment, he 
initial assumption is that in a given period of time no more than two agents need 
the same resource (we will relax this assumption in Section 7). When there is 
an overlap between the time segments in which two agents need the resource, 
these agents will be involved in a negotiation process. 
Full Information. Each agent knows all relevant information including the other 
agent’s utilities for the different outcomes over time (we will relax this assump- 
tion in Section 6). 
Rationality. The agents are rational; they try to maximize their utilities and 
behave according to their preferences. 
Commitments are Kept. If an agreement is reached both sides will honor it. 
No Long-Tenn Commitments. Each negotiation stands alone. An agent cannot 
commit itself to any future activity other than the agreed-upon schedule. 
Resource Division Possibilities. We assume that any division of the resource is 
possible (we will relax this assumption from Section 4 onwards). 
6 A pair of strategies (u, T) is a Nash equilibrium if, given 7, no strategy of agent 1 results in an outcome 
that agent 1 prefers to the outcome generated by (v, 7) and similarly for agent 2 given (T. 
(7) 
(8) 
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No Other Options. The agents have no alternative, but to continue the negotiations 
until an agreement is reached (we will relax this assumption from Section 4 
onwards). 
Common Belief. Assumptions ( 1)-( 7) are common belief. 
2.1. Strategies and equilibrium 
Our strategic model of negotiation is a model of Alternating Offers. 7 
How will a rational agent choose its negotiation strategy in such an environment? A 
useful notion is the Nash equilibrium [35,40]. If there is a unique equilibrium, and if 
it is known that an agent is designed to use this strategy, no agent will prefer to use a 
strategy other than this one. 
However, the use of Nash equilibrium is not an effective way of analyzing the out- 
comes of the models of Alternating Offers since there may be some points in the 
negotiation where one or more agents prefer to diverge from their Nash equilibrium 
strategies. Nash equilibrium strategies may be in equilibrium only in the beginning of 
the negotiation, but may be unstable in intermediate stages. Nash equilibrium puts few 
restrictions on the outcome and also yields too many equilibrium points (see ( [47] for 
the proof). 
Therefore, we will use the stronger notion of (subgame-)perJect equilibrium (PE) 
(see [47,50]) which requires that the agents’ strategies induce an equilibrium at any 
stage of the negotiation, i.e., in each stage of the negotiation, assuming that an agent 
follows the PE strategy, the other agent has no strategy better than to follow its own 
PE strategy. Subgame-perfect equilibrium is essentially a backward induction argument, 
using the rationality of agents at each stage of the game to decide what a good choice 
is and then rolling backward [ 591. So, if there is a (unique) perfect equilibrium, and 
if it is known that an agent is designed to use this strategy, no agent will prefer to use 
a strategy other than this one in each stage of the negotiations. 
We will consider different variations of this model. In the first case, we assume that 
the agents are bound to an agreement, i.e., the negotiation process can end only by 
reaching an agreement. Otherwise, the agents will continue to negotiate forever. In the 
second case, the agents are able to opt out at any stage of the negotiation. 
3. The bounding negotiations mechanism 
When agents are bounded to an agreement, negotiation may continue forever. The 
driving force for reaching an agreement in a reasonable amount of time is the agents’ 
attitudes toward negotiation time. We assume that negotiation time is expensive and taken 
into consideration by each agent. Even though the negotiation can continue indefinitely 
we will show that agreement will be reached without any delay. 
We utilize modified definitions from [41]. We assume that there is a set of agents 
A = {I, 2). We present a formal definition of an agreement. 
’ See [41] for a detailed review of the bargaining game of Alternating Offers. 
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Definition 1 (Agreement). An agreement is an ordered pair (~1. ST), in which Si is 
agent i’s portion of the resource. The set of possible agreements is 
S={(.S~,S~)EIW~: sl+.s2=1andsiLO, fori=1,2} 
Each agent has a preference over the set of possible agreements S. Our sole assumption 
is that an agent prefers an agreement that gives it a larger portion of the resource over 
an agreement that gives it less. 
Negotiation is a process that may include several iterations and may even continue 
forever. We assume that agents can take actions only at certain times in the set 7 = 
(0, 1,2...} that are fixed in advanced. In each period t E 7 one agent, say i, proposes 
an agreement from S, and the other agent (j) either accepts the offer (Yes) or rejects 
it (No). If the offer is accepted (j says Yes), then the negotiation ends with implemen- 
tation of the agreement (i.e., the resource is used according to the agreement). After 
a rejection, the rejecting agent then has to make a counteroffer and so on. There are 
no rules which bind the agents to any specific strategy. In particular, the agents are 
not bound to any previous offers that have been made. The mechanism only provides a 
framework for the negotiation process and specifies the termination condition, but there 
is no limit on the number of periods. An agent’s negotiation strategy in general is any 
function from the history of the negotiations to its next move. 
Definition 2 (Negotiation strategies). A strategy is a sequence of functions f = { f’}z. 
The domain of the ith element of a strategy is a sequence of offers of length i (all 
possible histories up to period i) and its range is the set {Yes, No} U S (its current 
move). 
That is, if f is a strategy for the first agent to make an offer (agent 1) then f” E S 
and for t even f’ : S’ + S, and for t odd f’ : St+’ -+ {Yes, No} (S’ is the set of all 
sequences of length t of elements in S and Yes and No are defined above). We denote 
by F the set of all strategies of the agent which starts the bargaining. Similarly, let G 
be the set of all strategies of the agent which, in the first move, has to respond to the 
other agent’s offer; that is, G is the set of all sequences of functions g = {g’}z such 
that for t even g’ : St+’ --f {Yes, No} and for t odd g’ : S’ -+ S. 
Let C( f, g) be a sequence of offers in which agent 1 starts the bargaining and adopts 
f E F, and agent 2 adopts g E G. Let Length( f,g) be the length of a(f,g> (where 
the length may be infinite). Let Last( f,g) be the last element of a(f,g) (if there is 
such an element). We present a formal definition for the outcome of the negotiation. 
Definition 3 (Outcome of the negotiation). The outcome function of the negotiation is 
defined by 
outcome(f’ g, = 
Disagreement, if Length( f, g) = 00, 
(Last ( f, g) , Length( f, g) - 1) , otherwise. 
Thus, the outcome (s, t) where s E S is interpreted as the reaching of agreement s 
in period t and the symbol Disagreement indicates a perpetual disagreement. 
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We note here that by defining an outcome to be either a pair (s, t) or Disagreement, 
we have made a restrictive assumption about the agents’ preferences. We assume that 
agents care only about the nature of the agreement, and the time at which the outcome 
is reached, and not about the sequence of offers and counteroffers that leads to the 
agreement, i.e., there is no “decision-regret” (see [ 421) . 
3.1. The agents’ utility functions 
We also assume that agent i E A has a continuous utility function over all possible 
outcomes: Ui: {S x I} U {Disagreement} -+ IX. Throughout the paper, when the utility 
for an agent from one outcome is greater than from another outcome, we will assume that 
the agent prefers the first outcome over the second (Due to assumption (3), Rationality, 
in Section 2). 
With the exception of Section 6 which considers situations with incomplete informa- 
tion, none of the results reported in this paper depend on the exact values of the utility 
functions over the possible outcome. The factor that plays the key role in reaching a 
specific agreement is the relation among the utility values of the outcomes. That is, 
whether the utility of an agreement s is greater than the utility s’ for a given agent, 
and not the exact utility values of s and s’. The results can be obtained in systems 
where the agents have preferences on the possible outcomes and not numerical utility 
functions. One of the issues related to the application of these results is the computing 
of these utility functions, or determining the preferences; this will be discussed briefly 
in Section 9. 
3.1. I. Attributes of the utility functions 
We now present a number of assumptions concerning the utility functions of the 
agents. This basic set of assumptions will be added to and modified in subsequent 
sections as we introduce additional conditions such as incomplete information, opting 
out, time, and multiple agents. Subscripts denote the section to which the specific 
assumption refers. 
The first assumption states that agents prefer any agreement in any given time period 
over the continuation of the negotiation process indefinitely. 
A03 (Disagreement is the worst outcome). For every s E S, i E A and t E 7, 
U’( (s, t) ) > U’( Disagreement). 
The next two conditions (Al3 and A23) concern the behavior of the utility function 
U’ on S x I, i.e., agreements reached in different time periods. Condition A13 requires 
that among agreements reached in the same period, agent i prefers larger portions of the 
resource. 
Al3 (The resource is valuable). For all t E 7, r, s E S and i E A: ri > si + 
U’( (r, t) > > fJ’( (s, t) > .8 For agreements that are reached within the same time period, 
each agent prefers to get a larger portion of the resource. 
’ For all s E S and i E A, Si is agent i’s portion of the resource. 
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The next assumption states that time is valuable to both sides. 
A23 (Time is valuable). For any tl, t2 E I, s E S and i E A, if tl < t2, U'( (s, tl)) 2 
U'((s,tz)). 
The next assumption greatly simplifies the behavior of the utility function for agree- 
ments. It requires that the difference in utility between (~1, tl) and (~2, t2) depends 
only on st , s2 and the differences between tl and t2. 
A33 (Stationarity).Forallr,sES, ti,t2,6EIandiEd, U’((r,tl)) >Ui((s,tl+ 
6)) iffu'((r,t:!)) L U'((s,t:!+S)) 
By assumption A23 the agents prefer to receive any given share of the resource sooner 
rather than later. The following assumption imposes the condition that the loss associated 
with any given amount is an increasing function of that amount. 
A43 (Increasing loss). For every i E A, t E 7 and s E S, there exists s’ E S such that 
U’((s,t)) = U’((s’,O)). Furthermore, for every s,r,s’,r’ E S such that U’((s,t>> = 
d((s’,O)) and U”((r,t)) =U’((r’,O)) ifs; > ri then si-si > ri-ri. 
3.1.2. Examples of utility functions 
We will examine two examples of utility functions which conform to assumptions 
A03-A43. 
3.1.2.1. Time constant discount rates 
In the first case, we consider a utility function with a time constant discount rate. That 
is, every agent i has a fixed discount rate 0 < Si < 1. If the agents reach an agreement 
in time period t in which agent i’s portion of the resource is si, then its utility will be 
Siaf. 
Definition 4 (Utility function with time constant discount rate). Let (s, t) E S x 7 be 
an outcome of the negotiation, then the Utility,( (s, t)) where i E A is defined to be 
Sisi, where 0 < Si < 1, and Utilityi{Disagreement} = -CXJ.~ 
3.1.2.2. Constant cost of delay 
The second case is of a utility function with a constant cost due to delay. Here, every 
agent bears a fixed cost for each period. That is, each agent i has a constant ci > 0, 
and if the agents reach an agreement in time period t in which agent i’s portion of the 
resource is si, then its utility will be si - qt. Formally: 
Definition 5 ( Utility function with a constant cost of delay). Let (s, t) E S x 7 be an 
outcome of the negotiation; then the Utility: { (s, t)} where i E A is defined to be si - Cit 
where ci > 0 and Utilityl{Disagreement} = -cc. 
’ Here, Sfsi denotes Si to the rth power times Si. 
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A utility function with a time constant discount rate satisfies all the above conditions, 
while a utility function with a constant cost due to delay satisfies all but A4s. 
3.2. Equilibrium yields agreement with no delay 
In [ 471 it was proved that for continuous utility functions that satisfy axioms AOs-A43 
there exists a unique PE, which results in the successful termination of the negotiation 
after the first period. lo This unique solution is characterized by a pair of agreements x*
and y* that satisfy these conditions: (1) agent 1 is indifferent between “y* today” and 
“x* tomorrow”, and (2) agent 2 is indifferent between “x* today” and “y* tomorrow”. 
When a unique pair of x* and y* satisfies this statement, here exists a unique PE 
[47]. The structure of the unique perfect equilibrium is as follows: agent 1 [2] always 
suggests x* [y*] and agent 2 [l] accepts any offer which is at least as good for it as 
.X* ry*1. 
We will now demonstrate the usage of these results for the two types of utility 
functions: (1) a constant discount rate; and (2) a constant cost of delay. 
3.2.1. Constant discount rate 
In the case of a utility function with a constant discount rate, as in Definition 4, agent 
1 has a discount rate of 0 < 61 < 1, and agent 2 has a discount rate of 0 < 8~ < 1, 
where Utility, ( (s, t) ) = 8: ( si) . According to the PE strategies, in every period of time, 
when it is agent l’s turn to make an offer, it will offer agent 2 ( &$-, w ) . When 
agent 1 receives an offer from agent 2, agent 1 will accept only the offers where its 
share of the resource is at least s1(1-82). 
On the other hand, when it ‘G”:gent 2’s turn to make an offer, it will offer 
( w , &$-). Agent 2 will accept an offer only if its share in it is at least w. 
The agreement that will be reached in the first period is ( &$-, w ). Formally: 
Lemma 6 (Rubinstein[47] ). Suppose agent 1 starts the negotiations. Let 
(f?g^) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the strategic model of Alternating Offers 
where the agents’ utility function is defined in Definition 4 iff 
f3(s”, . . . . s’-‘) = x* for all (so ,..., s’-l) E S’, 
if t is even, and 
&SO, ...) s’) = Yes, if si 2 y;, 
{ ’ 
No ifs: <yl*, 
if t is odd. The strategy g^ of agent 2 has the same structure; the roles of x* and y* 
are reversed, the words “odd” and “even” are interchanged, and each subscript 1 is 
lo Rubinstein’s results are actually more general, and consider the case of agents’ preferences in addition to 
their utility functions. We use utility function to be consistent with our approach in Section 6. 
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replaced by 2. The outcome is that agent 1 proposes a? in the$rst period (period 0), 
and agent 2 immediately accepts this offer. 
Proof. The proof and additional discussion can be found in [41]. 0 
Even though the structure of the strategic model of Alternating Offers allows nego- 
tiation to continue indefinitely, in the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium it terminates 
immediately. The exact agreement that will be reached depends mainly on the patience 
of the agents. An agent whose losses over time are less than its opponent’s will get 
a larger share of the resource. For example, if the agents have a utility function with 
discount rates then being less patient means having a larger value of aj. That is, if 61 is 
smaller, agent l’s share of the resource is smaller, while if 82 is smaller, agent l’s share 
is larger. 
In addition, the agent which starts the negotiation has an advantage over the other 
agent (for example, if both agents have the same rate of delay 6, then the first one will 
receive l/( 1 + 8) of the resource and the other will receive 6/( 1 + 6)). A simple way 
to avoid this asymmetry in the model is the following (see [ 4 1 ] > : at the beginning of 
each period each agent is chosen with probability i (independently across periods) to 
be the one to make the first offer. 
3.2.2. Constant cost of delay 
In the second case, suppose the agents’ utility function includes a constant cost of 
delay as defined in Definition 5. That is, Utilityi{(s, t)} = si - tit where ci > 0 and 
where i E A. Even though this utility function does not satisfy (A43), there is a unique 
PE if ct # ~2. 
Suppose agent 1 is more patient than agent 2. That is, it loses less over time than 
agent 2 (i.e., ci < ~2). In such a situation agent 1 is indifferent between “( 1 - cl, cl ) 
today” (i.e., y* = ( 1 - cl, cl ) ) and “( 1,0) tomorrow” (i.e., x* = ( 1,O) ) and agent 2 is 
indifferent between “( 1,O) today” and “( 1 - cl, cl ) tomorrow”. Therefore, if it is agent 
l’s turn to make an offer it will always offer (l,O). Agent 1 will accept any agreement 
in which its share of the resource is greater or equal to 1 - cl. Agent 2 will accept any 
agreement (including ( l,O)), and will offer ( 1 - cl, cl ). In the agreement that will 
be reached agent 1 will use the resource alone. The prediction here is quite surprising. 
Since agent 1 is more patient than agent 2, it can gain all the resource. Agent 2 prefers 
it over waiting an additional period. If cl > ~2, that is, agent 2 is more patient than 
agent 1, x* = (~2, 1 - ~2) and y* = (0,l). That is, when it is agent l’s turn to make 
an offer it will offer agent 2 (c2,l - ~2)) and will accept any offer. Agent 2 will accept 
1 - c2 and will offer (0,l). Here also the results are quite extreme. Agent l’s share 
will only equal agent 2’s delay. Here again, the agent whose turn it is to make the first 
offer is in a better position than the one which goes second. i’ 
These results demonstrate that introducing the time factor into the negotiation process 
can lead to an efficient negotiation. 
‘I Where cl = CT there are multiple subgame-perfect equilibria. 
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4. Unbounded negotiation mechanism when both agents lose over time 
Up to this point we have assumed that the agents have no choice but to continue 
the negotiation since disagreement is the worst outcome to both sides. Let us consider 
the case in which the agents have the ability to unilaterally opt out of the negotiation. 
This can happen when the agents try to satisfy a common goal but the agents have 
some other goals they can satisfy (usually with lower priority); a threat to leave the 
negotiation may influence the outcome in some cases. 
In the previous section, we have also assumed that the agents can divide the work/re- 
source between them, in any way that they have agreed upon. Unfortunately, this cannot 
usually be done. If two agents need to carry blocks, to deliver packages or to build 
tools, this work can be divided only in a discrete manner and usually in a finite number 
of possible agreements. From now on we will consider the case of a finite discrete case. 
That is, the simplifying assumptions ( 1 )-( 5) (Bilateral Negotiation, Full Information, 
Rationality, Commitments are Kept, No Long-Term Commitments) and assumption (8) 
( Common Belief) that are described at the beginning of Section 2 are still valid, while 
assumptions (6) (Resource Division Possibilities) and (7) (No Other Options) are no 
longer valid. We assume that there are A4 units of the work (or resource) that must be 
divided by two agents. 
Example 7. There are two agents that are responsible for the delivery of electronic 
newsletters of two different companies. The delivery is done by phone (either by fax 
machines or electronic mail). The expenses of the agents depend only on the number 
of phone calls. Therefore, if there is someone who subscribes to both companies’ 
newsletters, the two newsletters may be delivered to it by one of the agents for the 
price of only one phone call. The agents negotiate over the distribution of the common 
subscriptions. Each of the agents can opt out of the negotiations and deliver all of its 
own newsletters by itself. 
We slightly modify the definition of an agreement (Definition 1). The set of possible 
agreements, S, includes all the pairs (sr , ~2) E N2 where st + s2 = M. We also modify 
the negotiation strategies (Definition 2) such that if agent i receives an offer from its 
partner it can opt out of the negotiation (Opt), in addition to accepting the offer (Yes) 
or rejecting it (No). 
a( f, g), Length( f, g), Outcome( f, g) and the outcome of the negotiations are defined 
as in Section 2, but Outcome( f,g), which is the last element of a(f,g), can be either 
s E S or Opt. Thus the outcome (Opt, t) is interpreted as one of the agents opting out 
of the negotiation at period t. We note that the length of the time periods is fixed. The 
agents’ utility functions in this case are over agreements reached at various points in 
time, and over opting out at various points in time. That is, 
U’: {{S U {Opt}} x 7) U {Disagreement} + R. 
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4.1. Attributes of the utility functions 
The following set of assumptions, some of which are modifications of the original 
set presented in Section 3, are necessary to model the negotiation situation in which the 
parties can choose to opt out. 
Condition A03 (Disagreement is the worst outcome) of Section 3 is still valid. That 
is, disagreement is even worse than opting out. Formally we state it as follows: 
A04 (Disagreement is the worst outcome). For every s E S, i E A and t E I, 
U’( (s, t)) > U’(Disagreement) and U”( (Opt, t)) > U’(Disagreement). 
In this section we deal with the case of task distribution. In such situations, we 
assume that each agent prefers to do as little as possible. Therefore, condition A13 
(which was appropriate to the resource allocation case) is modified. We denote the 
modified condition by A14. That is Al4 requires that among agreements reached in the 
same period, agent i prefers smaller numbers of units si. 
A14 (Actions are costly). For all t E I, Y, s E S and i E A: Yi > si + U'( (r, t) ) < 
U’( (s, t) ) . For agreements that are reached within the same time period, each agent 
prefers to perform a smaller portion of the labor. 
A23 (Time is valuable) is still valid. We denote it by A24. 
We will consider the case of constant delay, in which any agent has a number ci > 0 
i E { 1,2} that satisfies the following condition.12 
A34 (Agreement’s cost over time). Each agent i E { 1,2} has a number ci > 0 such 
that: U’((s,tl)) 1 P((S,ta)) iff (si+citl) 5 (Si+Citz). 
We note that assumption A34 does not hold for Opt. We also assume that both agents 
prefer to opt out sooner rather than later. Formally: 
A44 (Opting out costs over time). For tl, t2 E 7 and i E { 1,2}, if tl < t2 then 
U’((Opt,t,)) > W(Opt,tz)). 
We do not make any assumption concerning the preferences of an agent for opting out 
versus an agreement. This enables us to consider different types of cases of opting out. 
Formally, there is no fixed s E S such that for every t E 7, U’( (s, t) ) = U’( (Opt, t) ) 
as in [51]. 
The main factor that plays a role in reaching an agreement when agents can opt 
out of the negotiation is the worst agreement for agent i in a given period t which is 
still preferable to i than opting out in time period t. We will denote this agreement by 
I2 In the rest of the paper we assume that CL is an integer. However, similar results can be obtained when Ci 
is any real number. 
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$’ E S. If agent i will not agree to such an agreement, its opponent has no other choice 
but to opt out. 
Definition 8 (Agreements that are preferred over opting out). For every period t E 7 
and agent i E A let 
Possiblef “zf {s’ 1 s’ E s, U”((s’,t)) > U’((Opt,t))) 
be the set of all the possible agreements that are preferred by agent i in period t to 
opting out in period t. If Possiblef is not empty, we define the agreement 3’9’ E Possible: 
to be the only one that satisfies 
U’W,t)) =sEmir&uiw)). 
Otherwise we define j:‘,‘= (-l,M+ 1) and j;2*t= (M+ 1,-l). 
If Possible,’ is not empty then there will be only one minimal Sl’*‘. This is because of 
assumption A 14 above. 
An agreement may only be reached if there is at least one agreement hat both agents 
prefer over opting out. So, in order to reach an agreement, an agent i should prefer over 
opting out the worst agreement for its opponent j other than j’s opting out. That is, 
agent i’s utility from the worst agreement for agent j in a given time t that is better to 
j than opting out (3’) is at least equal to i’s utility from the worst agreement for itself 
that is better than opting out (@) (i.e., if U’( (?i’, t)) 2 U’( (?*j, t))). Note that by 
Condition A34 if U’( (@, t)) 2 U’( (3’*‘, t)) then Uj( (Zip’, t)) 2 Uj( ($j,‘, t)). 
We will now introduce two additional assumptions that will ensure that an agreement 
will be reached. 
A54 (Agreements versus opting out). For every t E 7 i E { 1,2}, if U’( (s, t) ) > 
U’((Opt,t)) then U’((s,t- 1)) > U’((Opt,t- 1)). 
Assumption A54 then indicates that if an agreement is preferred over opting out in 
some time period, it will also be preferred in the previous time periods over opting out. 
That is, the set of acceptable agreements for an agent is not increasing over time. 
An additional assumption is necessary to ensure that an agreement is possible at least 
in the first period. That is, there is an agreement hat both agents prefer over opting out. 
A64 (Possible agreement). For all i, j E A, U’( ( ?i”, 0) ) 2 U”( (?,O, 0) ) 
ii,’ is the worst agreement for agent i in period 0 which is still better than opting out. 
We will assume that there is some time period T in which there is no agreement that 
is acceptable for both agents over opting out. This time period may be viewed as a 
deadline. 
A74 (Time period when agreement is not possible). There exists a time period T where 
for all i,j E d, U’((s^ Jr T) ) < U’( ( 3i,T, T) ). We denote the earliest of these time , 
periods by ?‘. 
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4.2. Agreement is guaranteed with no delay 
Even though the agents have the option to opt out of the negotiation in any step, if the 
agents use perfect equilibrium strategies, agreement will be reached without any delay. 
No agent will use the option of opting out since there are always agreements in the 
beginning of the negotiation that are better to both agents than opting out. If the agents 
use PE strategies, there is an agreement that is offered in the first time period by the 
first agent to make an offer, which will be preferred by its opponents over all possible 
future outcomes. As in the previous case (Section 3) when agents were bounded to an 
agreement, the main driving force for the agent to reach an agreement in this case is the 
cost of the negotiation time. The agents’ attitudes toward opting out versus agreements 
will only affect the details of the actual agreement hat is reached, but won’t drive any 
of the agents to opt out. 
As the first step to proving the existence of such an agreement, we will now prove 
that under the above assumptions, if the negotiation has not ended in periods prior to p, 
then an agreement will be reached in the period immediately prior to this period, i.e., 
in p - 1. The main reason is that both agents in the period prior to this period will try 
to avoid opting out and will agree to the worst agreement for themselves which is still 
better than opting out. 
Lemma 9 (Agreement will be reached prior to the time period when agreement is 
no longer possible). All the perfect equilibrium (PE) strategies of a model satisfying 
A04-A64 satisfy the following: If it is agent 2’s turn in time period F - 1 then using 
its PE strategy it will suggest SI1vT-’ and if it is agent 1 ‘s turn it will suggest S^2*T-1. In 
both cases the other party will accept he offer. 
Proof. First note that by A64 ? # 0 and therefore ? - 1 E 7. Now, suppose that it is 
agent 2’s turn to make an offer at time period ? - 1. It is clear that agreement won’t 
be reached after this period. Therefore, since disagreement is the worst outcome (A04), 
the negotiation process will end with one of the agents opting out. Actually, since the 
agents prefer opting out sooner rather than later (A44), agent 2 will opt out in the next 
time period. But, by A64 and A74, in time period ‘? - 1 there are still some agreements 
that both agents prefer over opting out (at least one). Agent 2 can choose the best 
agreement from its point of view and agent 1 does not have any other choice but to 
accept this offer. The best agreement from agent 2’s point of view is s”l,T-‘. The proof, 
when it is agent l’s turn to make an offer in time period p-- 1, is similar to this one. 0 
In the rest of the section, we assume that agent 1 is the first agent to make an offer. 
Since agent l’s and agent 2’s positions are similar, all the results can also be proved 
when agent 2 is the first to make an offer. 
We will now define the agreement hat will be offered by an agent when it is its turn 
to make an offer. This agreement will be acceptable to the other agent. The intuition 
behind this definition is the following: in each step the agent whose turn it is to make an 
offer considers the possible agreement hat can be reached in the following time periods. 
It may offer an agreement that will be better to the other agent than what that other 
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agent can get in the next periods. However, the offer will be the worst agreement among 
these possible future agreements. That is, since the agents are losing over time, the first 
agent will offer the second agent the possible agreement in the next period minus the 
second agent’s losses over time. The starting point is ir’ - 1 where the agreement that 
will be signed is clear from the previous lemma. The definition depends on whether ? 
is even or odd. 
Definition 10 (Acceptable agreements). 
l p is even. Suppose it is agent 2’s turn to make an offer in time period ir’ - 1, (i.e, 
~-1isodd).Letusdefinexr-‘=~‘~T-1.Foranyt~7,t=~-kk,1<k<~, 
if t is even we define 
Xf = (gf.T-1 -~k~~+(;k-l)q&~-~ +;kcz-(;k- 1)ct). 
If t is odd we define 
X’ = ($>‘-I 
- ;(k- 1)c2+ ;(k- I)c,,$~‘-~ + ;(k- l)c2-- ;(k- 1)~~). 
l ?’ is odd. In this case it-is agent l’s turn to make an offer in time period ir’ - 1. 
Letusdefine~~-*=3~,~-~.ForanytEI,t=~-k,l<kI~,iftisevenwe 
define 
-2.C 1 x’ = (St - ;(k - l)c2 + ;(k - l)c&*- + +(k- 1)~ - ;(k- 1)ct). 
If t is odd we define 
x’ = ($P’ + +kq - (;k - l)~~,sI;‘~-’ + (;k - 1)c2 - ;kq). 
If i‘ is even, that is, it is agent 2’s turn to make an offer before the period where 
no agreement can be reached, there is a small advantage to agent 2. If f is odd, there 1 
is some advantage to agent 1. However, since S1l*T-l and .?*T~-’ are quite close, the 
advantage in both cases is small. Also, the agent that is more patient gets a better offer. 
We will show by induction on k that if the agents follow their perfect equilibrium 
strategies, the agent whose turn it is to make an offer will offer xt and the other agent 
will accept this offer. 
The main idea behind the proof is the following: Both agents prefer X’ over opting 
out. Furthermore, both agents prefer xf in time period t over x’+’ at time period t + 1. 
And .t? is the best such agreement for the agent whose turn it is_ to make an offer in 
time period t. In particular, since in f - 1 the agreement will be xT-’ (as we proved in 
Lemma 9), it is clear that in p - 2, xtw2 is the best option for the agent whose turn it 
is to make an offer in time period p - 2. Similarly in previous time periods. 
AS4 (Losses due to opting out versus losses resulting from agreement). 
(1) For any t < ih, U’((@,t)) > Ui((Zi,r-l,t - 1)). 
(2) For any t < f, Zi2’ - itg’-’ 1. i(c2 - cl) and #St - 3i*r-1 5 i(ct - ~2). 
We note that the first part indicates that if there is at least one agreement acceptable 
to both sides (i.e., U’( ($Tj t) ) > U’( ( Slisr, t) ) ), then the agents also prefer the other 
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agent’s worst agreement that is still better to it than opting out in the next period, than 
opting out in the current period. If c’ = c2 then the second part (2) is always true. 
In the following lemmas we will describe the proofs for the case where f is even. 
The proofs where f is odd are similar. We first prove that x1 is preferred by both agents 
over opting out. 
Lemma 11 ( xr is acceptable). If the model satisfies assumptions A04-A84 then for any 
t~l, t=p-k, l<k<?, U’((x’,t)) >U’((Opt,t)). 
Proof. The proof is based on backward induction on t. 
Base case (t = ?” - 2): In this case, t is even and ,rfP2 = ( $qf-’ - ~2, $,‘- + ~2). 
We first show that the hypothesis is correct for agent 1. By A54, since U1 (( 3” 
f- l,?- I)) > U’((Opt,f - 1)) it is also the case that U’((Z’x’-I,?-2)) > 
U’ ((Opt,? - 2)). But, since actions are costly (A14), it is clear that U’( (Zt,‘-’ - 
c2,s2 Al&' +c2),?-2) > U’((Opt,P-2)). 
We now show it for agent 2. By A84, U2((i1*f-‘,f- 1)) > U2((~2,f-2,f - 2)) > 
U2 ( (Opt, ? - 2) ). By A34, it is clear that lJ2 ( (,I;,‘-’ - c2,9 n’,P-’ + cz),P - 2) 2 
U2((31,%1 
, T - 1)) and we can conclude that U2( ($*‘-’ nl,f-l +Q),T-2) > _ c2,32 
U2((Opt,C 2)). 
Induction case (t < f - 2): Suppose the hypothesis is true for any t’, t < t’ < f - 2 
and let t = ? - k. 
(1) If t is even x’ = ($t,‘-’ - ikc2 + (ik - l)c’,5iXf-’ + ikc2 - (ik - l)c’), 
which is actually (xi+’ - ~2, xi+’ + ~2). 
For agent 1, by the induction hypothesis, U’ ( (x’+’ ,t + 1) ) > U’ ( (Opt, t+ I> > 
and by A54 17’ ( (x”l , t) ) > U’ ( (Opt, t) ) . By A33 it is clear that U’ ( (xi+’ - 
c2,x;+' +C2),t) > U'((Opt,t)). 
For agent 2, by A84 U2( ($l,t-l ,p- 1)) > U2((327p-2,?-2)) and by A34 
s2 
*‘ST-’ < 3;J-2 _ c2 and s2 ^“T-1+~kc2-(~k-l)c, < Z;3f-2-c2+;kc2-(;k- 
1) c’ . It is enough to show that Pi,‘-2 - c2 -t 4 kc2 - ( i k - 1) c’ < @rPk. That 
is 32,~-2 _ S12,~-k <c2--kc2+(;k-l)c, But,c2-;kc2+(&k-1)~’ =(k- 
2;(f(q -cz)) and by A84 we can conclude that U2((x’,t)) > U2((Opt,t)). 
(2) If t is odd, X’ = ( $j9i-1 - ;(k - 1)c2 + ;(k - l)c,, @-’ + ;(k - 1)c2 - 
i( k - 1)~’ ) which is actually (x’+’ + c’, x'+' - CI ). 
The proof for agent 2 is similar to the proof for agent 1 when t is even. For 
agent 1, we need to show that Slf9r-’ - i(k - 1)~ + i(k - 1)~’ < c?~,~-~, i.e., 
*.1,-i-l ^ 
Sl - 3:vT-k < $( k - 1) (c:! - c’ ). This is clear by A84. 0 
We will now prove that xf in period t is preferred by both agents over x’+’ in t + 1. 
This is due to the construction of the x’s. For example, if t is even then agent 1 will 
do less in XI than in x’+‘. So, it is clear that agent 1 prefers it (agent 1 also gains a 
period). For agent 2, it needs to do exactly what it loses over time, and therefore the 
utility is the same from both options. 
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Lemma 12 (x’ is preferred over x’+‘). If the model satisfies assumptions A04-A84 
thenforanytEI, t=F--k, l<k~~,UU’((x’,t))>Ui((xtf’,t+l)). 
Proof. If t is even then xi = xi” - c2 and by A24 the claim is clear for agent 1. For 
agent 2, x$ = xi+’ + c:! and the claim is clear by A34. Similarly, when t is odd. 0 
We will now state our final results for this section. 
Theorem 13 (Agreement will be reached in the first period). Z’ the model satisfies as- 
sumptions A04-A84 and the agents follow their pegect equilibrium strategies, then 
l If p is even, agent 1 will ofSeer agent 2 in the first period ( ZiTT-’ - ipc2 + (if - 
I)c&’ + $fc, - (if - 1)cl) and agent 2 will accept the ofser. 
l If ? is odd, agent 1 will offer agent 2 in the first period ( ?f*T-’ - k (f - 1 )c2 + 
g- l)c&-1 +i(f--l)c2-i(f-1)~1)andagent2willaccepttheofler. 
Proof. Clear from the above lemmas. 0 
Example 14. We return to the example of the newsletter deliverers. Two electronic 
newsletters ( NI and N2) are delivered by separate delivery services (D1 and 02). The 
publisher of N1 pays DI $200 for the delivery of one edition of NI to all its subscribers, 
and the publisher of N2 pays D2 $225 per delivery. Each delivery to any subscriber 
(i.e., a phone call to the subscriber’s server) costs D1 or D2 $1, and each loses $1 
for each time period. There are M subscribers with subscriptions to both N1 and N2, 
and there are substantial savings to a delivery service if one or the other can deliver 
both newsletters. In the event that there is an agreement between D1 and D2 for joint 
deliveries to the M joint subscribers, then the publisher of N1 will pay DI $170, and 
the publisher of N2 will pay D2 $200 (the lower prices reflect the fact that there are 
competing advertisers in the two newsletters, and consequently their joint delivery may 
detract from the sales impact of each newsletter). They must still pay $1 per phone call 
to the server, and will lose $2 over time. 
A dollar is the smallest unit of currency in this example. 
Formally, 
U’((Opt,t)) =200-M-t, U’( (s, t)) = 170 - Sl - 2t, 
U2( (Opt, t)) = 225 - A4 - t, U2((s,t>> =200-s2-2t. 
Suppose M = 100. Then Sl’*f = (69 - t, 31 + t), j;2,t = (26 + t, 74 - t) and ?’ = 22. l3 
Since p is even, by Theorem 13 the agreement that will be reached in the first period is 
(46,54). 
I3 We note that Ui(?-‘, t) > b”( (Opt, t)) (see Definition 8). 
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5. One agent gains over time while the other loses 
We now consider the case where one of the agents is gaining over time and one is 
losing over time. This is the usual situation when the agents are sharing a common 
resource, and one of them already has access to the resource and is using it during 
the negotiation process. That is, in each negotiation interaction, there are two agents: 
A which is currently using (attached to) the resource and W which is waiting to use 
the resource. The agents start a negotiation process on the re-division of the resource 
between them. A continues to use the resource until the negotiation process ends (if 
ever). As in the previous section, we assume that only discrete agreements can be 
reached. That is, s = { (SA, SW) E N*: s.4 + SW = M}. l4 We assume that both agents 
can opt out of the negotiation. 
5.1. Attributes of the utility functions 
We will now modify the definitions of the previous sections to fit this new situation. 
We will need to modify some of our assumptions concerning the utility functions of the 
agents. 
First we assume that the least preferred outcome for W is disagreement (Disagree- 
ment) while for A it is the most preferred outcome. 
A05 (Disagreement). For each x E {{~U{Opt}} x I}: UA(x) < UA(Disagreement) 
and Uw (Disagreement) < Uw (x) . Agent A prefers disagreement over all other pos- 
sible outcomes while agent W prefers any possible outcome over disagreement. 
Assumption AOs is not a formal conclusion from assumptions A25 and A35 below, 
but it is well motivated by them. The reason is that we need to define the limit situation. 
We could define it differently as well without changing anything. For example we could 
assume that disagreement is the worst outcome to both agents. 
Since we consider here the resource allocation problem, assumption Als that asserts 
that the resource is valuable is also valid in this case. We denote it by Alj. 
A23 is no longer valid, since time is valuable only for W and not for A. Therefore 
we modify condition A23. 
A25 (Cost over time). For any tl, t2 E I, s E S and i E A, if tl < t2, then 
uW((s,tl)) > uW((s,t2)) and UA((s,tl)) I UA((s,t2)). 
Similarly, we modify assumption A3. 
A35 (Agreement’s cost over time). Each agent i E {W, A} has a number ci such that: 
Vtl,t2 E 7, S,S E S, U’((s,tl)) 2 Ui((S,t2)) iff (si+citl) 2 (Si+cit2), where 
cw < 0 and CA > 0. l5 
I4 Throughout the rest of the paper, A’s portion in an agreement will be written first. 
I5 We note the change in the direction of the inequality from A34, since here the resource is valuable, while 
in Section 4 we deal with costly action. 
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We assume that agent A gains over time (CA > 0) and that agent W loses over time 
( cw < 0)) i.e., agent W prefers to obtain any given number of units sooner rather than 
later, while agent A prefers to obtain any given number of units later rather than sooner. 
Notice that assumptions Al5 and A25 are simple conclusions from assumption A35. 
We still would like to be able to distinguish between the two different properties of the 
utility functions. One is the desirability of the resource and the second is monotonic 
cost over time. 
A45 (Cost of opting out over time). For any t E 7, Uw ( (Opt, t) ) > Uw( (Opt, t + I ) ) 
and UA((Opt,t>> < UA((Opt,t+ 1)). 
W prefers opting out sooner rather than later and A always prefers opting out later 
rather than sooner. This is because A gains over time while W loses over time. For this 
reason A would never opt out. In the worst case A would prefer for agent W to opt out 
in the next period. 
5.2. Agreement is guaranteed at the latest in the second period 
Even though agent A prefers to continue the negotiation indefinitely, an agreement 
will be reached (after a finite number of periods). The reason for this is that agent 
W can threaten to opt out at any given time. This threat is the driving force of the 
negotiation process toward an agreement. If there is some agreement s that A prefers at 
time t over W’s opting out in the next period t + 1, then it may agree to s. 
So the main factor that plays a role in reaching an agreement is the worst agreement 
for agent W in a given period t which is still preferable to W than opting out in time 
period t. As in Section 4 we will denote this agreement by @’ E S. If agent A will not 
agree to such an agreement, its opponent has no other choice but to opt out. 
Agent A’s loss from opting out is greater than that of W. This is because A’s session 
(of using the resource) is interrupted in the middle. Thus, we must modify assumption 
A5 to meet the current circumstances. 
A55 (Range for agreement). For every t E 7, Uw ( ( jK:‘, t) ) > Uw( ( 3K:r+1, t + 1) >, 
UW( (Opt, t)) > P( (Ff+l ,t+l)),andifs^T’>OthenUA((ZW,‘,t)) >UA((Opt,t+ 
1)) and UA((?w’+‘,t+ 1)) > UA((iKr,t)). 
If there are some agreements that agent W prefers over opting out, then agent A also 
prefers at least one of those agreements over W’s opting out even in the next period. 
We assume that assumption A64 is still valid and denote it by A65. Assumptions A74 
and A84 are not needed in the current situation. 
We consider two cases. In the first case an agent loses less per period while waiting 
than it can gain per period while using the resource. In the second situation, an agent 
loses more while waiting for the resource than it can gain while using the resource. For 
this second agent, sharing a resource with others is not efficient. Therefore, it prefers to 
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have its own private resource if possible. However, in some cases the agents don’t have 
any choice, but to share a resource (like a road junction or another expensive resource). 
We first consider the case where W loses less over time than A can gain over time. 
In such a case for any offer, if it is big enough, it is possible to find an offer in 
the future that will be better for both sides, i.e, both agents have positive total gain. 
Although it might appear that such an assumption will cause long delays in reaching an 
agreement, we will prove that in fact the delay will be at most one period since W may 
opt out. However, since better agreements for both parties can be found in the future, 
the agreement that is reached is not Pareto-optimal over time. 
The intuition behind this proof is as follows. If it is not agent W’s turn to make an 
offer in some time period t, it can always opt out and gain utility similar to that of j.wt 
(actually, between ?zt and S$’ - 1). So, in time period t - 1, W will never make a 
better offer to A than $7’ + jcw[, which is its benefit from opting out in the next period 
with the addition of W’s loss over time (note that cw < 0). But A will refuse such an 
offer, since A prefers waiting a period and offering W twr E S. This offer will prevent 
W from opting out, and if W accepts the offer, A’s share will be $7’ + CA which is 
better to A than 37’ + \cw/ since /cw/ < CA. 
So, an agreement won’t be achieved when it is W’s turn to make an offer and there is 
still the possibility of an agreement in the next period. On the other hand if A offers W 
something less preferred by W than j.w,t, W will opt out since it will never receive in any 
given time period in the future t’ anything more than Z’@, and W prefers opting out over 
it. So, in order to prevent W from opting out A should offer it ?w;r which is acceptable 
to W. So, if W is the first agent to make an offer (this is a reasonable assumption 
since A is using the resource and does not have a motive to start the negotiations), the 
agreement will be reached in the second period with iw;‘. If A is the first one, agreement 
will be reached in the first period with iw,‘. 
The second case considers the situation where agent W’s losses over time are greater 
than agent A’s gains. In this model, for any agreement in period t E 7, there is no 
other agreement in the future that both agents will prefer over this agreement. On the 
other hand if an agreement s in period t is small enough, one can find an agreement 
in a period earlier than t which both agents prefer over s in period t. According to 
our assumptions, this property will cause the agents to reach an agreement in the first 
period. 
In each period in this case, if an agreement exists which agent W prefers over opting 
out there exists such an agreement which agent A cannot reject. The idea is the following. 
Agent W will accept or make an offer only if it is better for it than opting out. If A 
receives an offer such that there is no better agreement for it in the future, and it is also 
better for W than opting out, and if A prefers this offer over W opting out in the next 
period, it must accept this offer. Otherwise, if this agreement is rejected, W should opt 
out as soon as possible, since it cannot expect to do any better than opting out. But if 
A prefers the proposed agreement over W’s opting out in the next time period, it should 
accept the offer. 
Such an agreement, i.e., the type which will be reached in some period t E ‘T where 
there is still a possibility for reaching an agreement in the next time period, will be 
at most (from W’s point of view) 2%‘. The reason for that is that if there is still a 
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possibility for an agreement in t + 1, A wants to delay reaching an agreement. By 
offering 9w,t A prevents W from opting out, and gains another period of time. On the 
other hand, A won’t accept anything worth less to it than slwt+‘, since A can always 
wait until the next period, gain a period, and reach such an agreement. Therefore, in a 
given time period T + 1, A won’t accept anything worth less than ?Tr+’ + CA + 1. But 
this agreement is better to A than anything that is acceptable to W in the future. On the 
other hand, since W loses over time more than A can gain, this agreement is also better 
to W over anything it can get in the future. 
The next theorem is a formal statement of the above. 
Theorem 15 (Agreement will be reached in the first or second period). Let (f?g^) be 
a PE of a model satisfying A&-A&. Suppose agent W is the first to make an offer. 
l W loses less than A can gain. If Icw( < CA, then Outcome(~,~) = (@‘,q’>, 1). 
l W loses more than A can gain. Zf 1~~1 > CA, then Outcome( f? g) = ((q’ $ 1 -t 
C,,$ - 1 -cA),o) 
If A is the first agent to make an offer then Outcome( x g) = ((q”, co), 0). 
Proof. The proof uses similar techniques to the proof of Theorem 13. The first claim 
is clear from the intuition above. For the second part, we will show that in any given 
time period T, where agreement is still possible in T + 1, there is no agreement in the 
future which is better to A than ?Fr+’ + CA + 1 which is also better to W than opting 
out in T + 1. It is clear for time period T + 1. Suppose t > 1 and suppose there is an 
agreement s in time T + t such that sA + tcA > slFT+’ + CA + 1. That is, SW + CA + 1 < 
izr+’ + tc,J, i.e., sw < izr+’ + CA (t - 1) - 1. However, /CW[ > CA and therefore, 
S’V < SW +r+’ + Icwl(t - 1) - 1 and SW - tlcwj < $?+’ - lcwl - 1 and we may conclude 
that Uw( (s, t)) < Uw( (ZT’+’ + l,@r+’ - l),T+ 1) 5 UW((Opt,T+ 1)). 0 
Example 16. The US and Germany have embarked on a joint scientific mission to Mars 
involving separate mobile labs launched from a single shuttle in orbit around the planet. 
Each country has contracts with a number of companies for the conduct of experiments. 
These experiments were preprogrammed prior to launch. Arrangements were made prior 
to launch for the sharing of some equipment to avoid duplication and excess weight on 
the mission. Instructions to begin each experiment must be sent from Earth. 
The US antenna was damaged during landing, and it is expected that communications 
between the US and its lab on Mars will be down for repairs for one day (1440 
minutes) of the planned five-day duration of the mission. The US can use a weaker and 
less reliable backup line, but this involves diverting this line from other costly space 
experiments, and thus the expense of using this line is very high to the US. The US 
would like to share use of the German line during the one-day period so that it can 
conduct its planned research program. Only one research group can use the line at a 
time, and that line will be in use for the entire duration of the particular experiment. 
A negotiation ensues between the two labs over division of use of the German line, 
during which time the Germans have sole access to the line, and the US cannot conduct 
any of its experiments (except by use of the very expensive backup). By prearrangement, 
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the Germans are using some of the US equipment for their experiments, and are gaining 
$5000 per minute. While the Germans cannot conduct any of their experiments without 
some US equipment, the US could conduct some of its experiments without German 
equipment. The US is losing $3000 per minute during the period in which they must 
rely on their backup communications line. An agreement between the US and Germany 
to share the communications line will result in a $1000 gain per period (minute) for 
each group. 
If an agreement on sharing the line is not reached, the US can threaten to opt out 
of the arrangement. In this case, the US will be able to conduct a small portion of its 
experiments by using all of its equipment and no German equipment, and by using the 
backup communications line. The overall US gain will be $550,000, but it will lose 
$1000 per any minute of the negotiation. If the US opts out, the Germans will not be 
able to continue their experiments (without the US equipment) and their gain will be 
restricted to whatever they had gained at the point the US opted out. If the Germans 
opt out, they will need to pay the US $100,000 for use of the US equipment up to that 
point. Note that the Germans play the role of A (attached to the communication line) 
and the US plays the role of W (waiting for the line). A dollar is the smallest unit of 
currency in this example. 
Formally, 
ug((&t>> = lOOOs, + 5000t, 
V( (Opt,, t) ) = 5000t, 
V((Opts,t)) =5000t- 1OOOOO; 
UU((&O) = lOOOs, - 3000t, 
rrU( (Opt,, t)) = 550000 - lOOOt, 
V((Opt,,t>> = -1OOOt; 
M = 1440. 
The Germans prefer any agreement over opting out. 
SZ,’ = 551 + 2t. 
An agreement will be reached in the second period (period 1) with (887,553). 
It should be noted that there are agreements in the future that both agents prefer over 
reaching the agreement (887,553) in the second period. This is because the Germans 
gain more over time than the US loses over time. For example, the agreement (879,561) 
in the fourth time period (period 3) is better for both agents than (887,553) in the 
second time period. The problem is that there is no way that the US can be sure that 
when the fourth time period arrives, the German will offer them (879,561) . In that time 
the Germans need to offer only (885,555) in order to prevent the US from opting out, 
and they don’t have any motivation to offer more. 
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6. Agents with incomplete information 
Up to this point we have assumed that the agents have full information about each 
other. But in most cases, the agents do not have complete information about each other 
and about the environment. The incompleteness of information may be the result of 
different factors. For example, an agent may hide its actions from the other agents; 
an agent may not be able to explore the environment and may be missing information 
about the environment; the resources that are available to one agent are not known to 
the others; or one agent is not familiar with its opponent’s utility function. 
We will consider situations when the agents have incomplete information about each 
other’s utility functions. The situation of incomplete information becomes even more 
interesting when we can expect recurring encounters between the same two agents. The 
agents can use information obtained in one encounter in a subsequent one. So, we will 
assume that there is a set of agents whose members negotiate with each other, from time 
to time, on sharing a resource. However, we still assume that in a given period of time 
no more than two agents need the same resource (assumption of a Bilateral Negotiation 
of Section 2) . When there is an overlap between the time segments in which two 
agents need the same resource, these agents will be involved in a negotiation process. 
Also the simplifying assumption (5) of the beginning of Section 2 (No Long-Term 
Commitments) is still valid. That is, an agent cannot commit itself to any future activity 
other than the agreed-upon schedule. The relaxation of this assumption is not within the 
scope of this paper. 
We note that a given agent may play different roles in different negotiation interactions. 
Sometimes, it uses the resource while another agent is also trying to use it (i.e., it plays 
the role of A). In other situations, an agent may need the resource while another agent 
is currently using it (i.e., it plays the role of IV). 
We assume that there is a finite set of types of agents in the environment (Type = 
{ 1,. . . , It}), and each has a different utility function which depends on its resource 
usage. The different distributions of resource usage among the agents can be due to 
different tasks that the agents are executing, or different configurations. For example, 
if all the agents are communications servers that share a common communication line 
then an agent that has smaller disk space will use the resource more frequently than an 
agent that has larger disk space. The first agent is a heavier user of the resource, while 
the second is the lighter user of the resource. 
When j E Type plays the role of W (waiting for the resource) we denote it by Wj, 
and when it plays the role of A (attached to the resource) we denote it by Aj. We 
also assume that each agent maintains some probability belief concerning its opponent’s 
type. I6 We denote by c#$, where i E {A, W}, j E Type, i’s probability of its opponent 
being of type j. We assume that Vi E {A, W}, J$, $$. = 1. This probability belief 
changes over time. We denote by A the set of all possible configurations of agents, i.e., 
A = {w,, w2,. . . , Wk,Al,. . . ,fik}. 
I6 In recent work [ 281 we have developed a logic of probabalistic belief and time, which was integrated 
into the strategic model of negotiation. It was shown to be useful in cases of more complicated incomplete 
information. 
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6.1. Sequential equilibrium 
In Sections 3, 4 and 5 we have analyzed the situation using the notion of “( subgame- 
)perfect equilibrium”. That is, we required that each agent’s action be optimal for any 
“subgame”, not just at the start of the negotiation. When there is incomplete information 
there is no proper subgame. In the incomplete information situation we will be talking 
about sequential equilibrium instead [ 291. A sequential equilibrium includes, in addition 
to a profile of strategies (as in PE) , a system of beliefs. 
That is, a sequential equilibrium is a sequence of 2k strategies (one for each possible 
agentAi,Az ,..., Ak,Wl,.. . , Wk) and a system of belief with the following properties: 
each agent has a belief about its opponent’s type. At each negotiation step r the strategy 
for agent i is optimal given its current belief (at step t) and its opponents possible 
strategies in the SE. At each negotiation step t each agent’s belief (about its opponent’s 
type) is consistent with the history of the negotiation. That is, the agents’ belief may 
change over time, but only consistent with the history. We assume that each agent in a 
negotiation interaction has an initial probability belief about its opponent’s type. 
We will define these notions formally. 
Definition 17 (History). For any step t E 7 of the negotiation let h(t) be the history 
through time step t. h(t) is a sequence of t proposals and responses. 
A strategy for each agent as defined above specifies an action for every possible history 
after which it has to move. A sequence of 2k strategies, one for each possible agent 
A ,,..., &,W ,,... , wk, leads, from the point of view of the agents, to a probability 
distribution over outcomes. For example, if agent A believes with probability #;’ that its 
opponent is of type 1 then A expects that with probability c#$ the outcome is determined 
by the strategy that is specified to A and the strategy that is specified in the sequential 
equilibrium to WI. If A believes that W’s type is k with probability c#;, then it assumes 
that with probability c#$ the outcome will be the result of W’s usage of the strategy that 
is specified in the sequential equilibrium for type k and its own strategy. The agents use 
expected utility to compare among these outcomes. 
In order to state the requirement that an agent’s strategy be optimal for every his- 
tory, we must specify its beliefs about the other agent’s type. Therefore the notion of 
sequential equilibrium requires us to specify two elements: the profile of strategies and 
the beliefs of the agents. 
Definition 18 (System of beliefs). A system of beliefs is a function pi(h) which is a 
probability distribution of i’s opponents as a function of the history. That is, pi(h) = 
{#&.. . , c#&} describes agent i E {A, W} belief about its opponent’s type according to 
a given history of offers and counteroffers h. 
For example, suppose there are three types of agents in the environment, and suppose 
that before the negotiation starts A believes that with probability 1 its opponent is of 
type 1, with probability i it is of type 2 and with probability $ its opponent is of type 
3. That is, PA (0) = ( i, $, a). Now suppose A receives an offer s from its opponent W. 
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A may now change its beliefs. For example, it may conclude that its opponent can’t be 
of type 3, but rather there is probability 3 that it is of type 1 and 5 that it is of type 2. 
That is, PA(S) = (5, i,O). 
We impose three conditions on the sequence of strategies and the agent’s system of 
beliefs: 
l Sequential Rationality. The optimality of agent i’s strategy after any history h 
depends on the strategies of WI, . . . , Wk and on its beliefs pi(h). That is, agent i 
tries to maximize its expected utility, with regard to the strategies of its opponents 
and its beliefs about the probabilities of its opponent’s type according to the given 
history. It does not take into consideration possible interactions in the future. 
l Consistency. Agent i’s belief pi(h) should be consistent with its initial belief pi( 0) 
and with the possible strategies of its opponent. An agent must, whenever possible, 
use Bayes’ rule to update its beliefs. 
If, after any history, the strategies of the agent’s opponent, regardless of its type, 
call for it to reject an offer and make the same counteroffer, and this counteroffer 
is indeed made, then the agent’s beliefs remains the same as before it made the 
offer. If only one of the strategies of the opponent, for example, type j, specifies 
that the offer made by the agent may be rejected and the counteroffer s be made, 
and the counteroffer s is indeed made, then it believes with probability 1 that its 
opponent’s type is indeed j. 
We return to the above example, where there are three types of agents in the 
environment. Suppose A’s original belief was PA (8) = (3, $, i) as above. And 
suppose that the strategies of Wi, W2 and W3 specify that in the beginning all of 
them will make an offer s, then A’s beliefs can’t be changed if it indeed receives the 
offer S. However, if the strategies Wt and W2 specify the offer s, but Ws specifies 
the offer s’ then if A receives an offer s’ it believes that its opponent is of type 3. 
That is, PA(S) = (O,O, 1). 
l Never dissuaded once convinced. Once an agent is convinced of the type of its 
opponent with probability 1, or convinced that its opponent can’t be of a specific 
type, i.e., the probability of this type is 0, it is never dissuaded from its view. The 
condition implies, for example, that in the above example, once agent A reaches 
the conclusion that its opponent is Ws it cannot revise its belief, even if agent W 
subsequently deviates from Ws’s strategy. From this point on A is engaged in a 
perfect information negotiation with agent W3. I7 
Definition 19. Sequential equilibrium is a sequence of 2k strategies and a system of 
beliefs pi(h) , i E Type that satisfy the conditions of Sequential Rationality, Consistency 
and Never Dissuaded Once Convinced. 
6.2. Attributes of the utility functions 
We will now change our assumptions to fit the case of incomplete information. 
Assumptions AOs-A65 are still valid. We denote them by A@-A66. We only add some 
I7 See [ 361 for a discussion of this assumption. We leave the relaxation of this assumption for future work. 
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additional requirements to A45. 
As in A45 we assume that each agent has utility with a constant cost of time ci. We 
will concentrate on the cases where agent Ai, i E Type, gains over time (CA, > 0) and 
agent Wi loses over time ( CW, < 0). Agent W prefers any given portion of the resource 
sooner rather than later, while agent A prefers any given portion of the resource later 
rather than sooner. The exact values, CA, and CW, are private information. That is, agent 
Ai knows its private gain CA,, but may not know CW,, although it knows that it is one of 
k values. 
We return to the situation of two agents, one A is attached to the resource, and is 
gaining over time, while the other W is waiting to access the resource, and is losing 
over time. The set of agents is A = {WI, W2,. . . , Wk, Al,. . . , Ak} (see the beginning 
of this section). 
We will consider the situation where it is common belief that 1~~~1 < (cw~_, 1< . . . < 
lcW,I < ICAal < ’ .’ < (CA, I. That is, agent Wk loses less than agent WI loses while 
waiting for the resource. Agent Ak also gains less than A, while using the resource. 
Both agents lose less while waiting than they can gain while using the resource. ‘* We 
-wk-I ,f also assume that for any time period t, s^F%’ < sA < . . . < iy”. I9 That is, Wk is 
more willing to opt out (compared with reaching an agreement) than WI. We show that 
in situations that satisfy conditions AOh-A66, there exists a sequence of strategies that 
are in sequential equilibrium. 2o 
6.3. Negotiation ends in the second period 
If the above assumptions hold and the agents use sequential equilibrium strategies, 
then the negotiation will end in the second period. The agents will reach an agreement in 
this period with high probability. The exact probability and the details of the agreement 
depend on agent A’s initial belief. As A’s belief about its opponent’s type becomes more 
adequate, the probability that its opponent will opt out decreases. 
The probability that an agreement will be reached depends also on A’s type. As the 
difference between A’s utility from agreement and its utility from opting out decreases, 
the probability that W will opt out decreases. 
We will show that all agents that play the role of W (regardless of their type) will 
try to deceive their opponents, and behave as the strongest agent Wk in the first period. 
Agent A will ignore their offer, and will make its counteroffer in the second period, 
based on its initial belief and its type. In most of the cases this offer will be accepted. 
In the rest of the paper, we will describe these results. 
lx As we explained above, there are situations where an agent loses more while waiting for the resource than 
it can gain while using the resource. For this agent sharing a resource with others is not efficient. Therefore, 
it prefers to have its own private resource if possible. However, in some cases the agents have no choice but 
to share a resource (like a road junction or another expensive resource). Our approach is also applicable in 
some of these situations but common belief about the agents’ beliefs is needed. 
t9 As we defined above, for i, j E Type, cw, denotes agent Wi’s loss over time and CA, denotes agent Aj’s 
gain over time. Bwt,’ is the worst agreement for agent Wi which is still better than opting out. The subscript 
A, i.e., iy3’ indicates A’s portion of the resource in the agreement s^wc,‘. 
*” It is enough to assume that sA -wkJ + lCWkl < q-r3 + Icw,_, 1 < ” < 3y + IcwlI. 
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We first define another notion that captures the belief of an agent about how strong 
its opponent is. 
Definition 20 (The strongest an opponent can be believed to be). Let pnl (h) be the 
system of beliefs of agent m after history h. Let n’ be the maximal n E Type such 
that q@ # 0. n’ is the strongest agent that m believes its opponent may be. 
In the next lemma we will show the exact agreements each of the agents makes or 
accepts in a given time period t. 
Lemma 21( 1) indicates that Wi won’t offer A anything better than its possible utility 
from opting out in the next period, with the addition of Wt’s loss over time. It can 
always wait another time period and opt out. That is, Wi won’t offer A anything better 
than its offer in the situation of full information. 
In Lemma 21(2) we will show that A will behave toward W no better than it will 
toward the strongest type A believes W may be. That is, if A believes that W can’t 
be stronger than Wi, it won’t offer it more than it will offer to Wj when there is full 
information and W is indeed Wj. 
Lemma 21(3) indicates that if Wi gets an offer worth less to it than opting out (less 
than sewed’), it will really opt out. We will show that if Wi rejects this offer it won’t 
receive any future offers better than this one. But it prefers opting out over reaching this 
agreement. On the other hand, if Wi does receive an agreement at least as good as it 
can get from opting out, it should accept it. Wi won’t be offered any agreement better 
than that (Lemma 21(4)). 
Lemma 21 (Agreements that are accepted and agreements that are rejected by the 
agents). Suppose agent W is of type i E Type and A is of type j E Type, and the agents’ 
utility fUnCtiOnS Sati& A16-A66, 2:’ - tT’+’ < C& Let nA E Type be the strongest 
type A believes its opponent can be (as defined in Definition 20). If both W and A use 
their sequential equilibrium strategies then the following holds: 
(1) The best offer to A that may be made by Wi: Wi will not ofleer A in step t more 
than s”T”+’ + (cw,l. 
(2) The best agreement to agent W that may be made or accepted by Aj: Aj will not 
..W,ga .r+ 1accept anything less than sA 
than ?wC1~ 9’. 
+ cAj in step t and won’t offer anything more 
(3) When Wi will opt out: Ifin step t the offer that Aj makes to Wt is less than Sl$“, 
then Wt opts out in step t. 
(4) The offers that will be accepted by Wi: Zf in step t, Aj makes an ofSeer s such that 
SW 2 Sl$“, Wi accepts the offer. 
Proof. ( 1) It is clear that any type of W won’t offer A more than $y,‘+’ + Icw;/ since 
it can always wait until the next time period, opt out, and achieve a better outcome. 
(2) When it is A’s turn to make an offer in a given time period t, and it believes that 
nA is the strongest type W may be, then it will never offer anything better for W than 
QW,z~.r. This offer will prevent any type of W that A believes W can be, from opting out. 
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This is the main goal of A; if W rejects its offer but doesn’t opt out, A earns another 
time period of using the resource. 
If A is offered anything less than ?TAVf+’ + ICA~ 1amount of the resource in time period 
t it should reject this offer; it can always wait another time period, offer W $w~~J+’ 
and since it gains over time CA,, its utility will be at least as large as the utility of 
“W,ZA Jfl 
SA + lcAjl at time t. 
(3) This will be proved by induction on the number of types ( IType]). We note that 
UwJ ( (Opt, t) ) > Uwi ( ( Zwl*‘+‘, t + 1) > . This is because we deal with a discrete case and 
by assumption A&. 
Base case (only two types) k = 2: If there are only two types, it is clear by Lemma 
21(2) that in any future time period t’ A won’t offer W more than 9Wz,“. However, W2 
prefers opting out now over the possibility of getting s^w2~” in future time periods t’. The 
only way for A to prevent W2 from opting out now is by offering at least s^w2g’, which 
is the worst agreement to WZ that is still better than opting out. That is, if W2 is offered 
anything less than Zw2,’ at time t it will opt out. 
Suppose A offers less than 3wl*‘. It is clear that in such a situation W2 will opt out 
since $7,’ < Q’. So, if W doesn’t opt out after receiving such an offer, it will be clear 
to A that its opponent is WI. So, by (2) A won’t offer to W in the future (t’) anything 
better to W than s”wI*T’, but WI prefers opting out now over S^W1*r’ in time t’. 
k = k’ + 1: Suppose the assumption is correct for IType = k’, and a new type i is 
added. If A offers something less than s^w;v’, all the other types of W that are stronger 
than i opt out, by the induction hypothesis. Therefore, if Wi won’t opt out, A will know 
that its opponent is at most i, and won’t offer anything better in the future (t’) than 
Zwl,t’ (by (2)). 
(4) Similar to (3). 0 
Based on this lemma we prove that all agents that play the role of W, regardless 
of their type, will behave as the strongest type when it is their turn to make an offer. 
From Lemma 21(l), it is clear that agent Wi won’t offer anything more to A than 
Zy*t+l + 1~~~1. If so, if there is an agent that offers more, A can conclude that its type is 
weaker than i. But in such a case, A is better off waiting and offering W an agreement 
on a scale that it might make if its opponent was weak. So, it isn’t worth it for an agent 
in the first period to reveal that it is weak. It can only lose from that. Therefore, all the 
types of agent W behave as the strongest one. 
When it is A’s turn to make an offer, it should try to maximize its expected utility. So, 
it needs to calculate for which agreement, according to its beliefs, its expected utility 
will be the highest. This is, by taking into account that if it offers its opponent an 
agreement that fits Wi ( s^w-‘), and its opponent is stronger than i, it will opt out. If it is 
of type i or weaker than i it will accept the offer. 
Lemma 22 ( W will pretend to be strong and A will behave according to its expected 
utility). Suppose, agent W is of type i E Type and A is of type j E Type, and the 
agents’ utility functions satisfy AOe-A66, $7’ - Slytf’ < c&. If both W and A use their 
sequential equilibrium strategies then the following properties hold: 
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(i) An agent of type i E Type will accept any offer greater or equal to $*‘. 
(ii) All agents of type W, regardless of their types, will offer in any time period t 
SIT”+’ + Icwk 1amount of the resource. 
(iii) Suppose A has a probability belief of (c&‘, . ...&). where#+...+&‘= I.Let 
Expect(s^Wit’) =(~1+...+~i)UA((S”W,,r,t))+(~i+l+...+~k)UA((Upt,t)). 
Let 1 E Type such that Expect( s^yg’) is maximal over any i E Type. A will offer 
s^w;*t in time period t when it is its turn to make an offer. 
Proof. (i) It is clear by Lemma 21(4). 
(ii) We prove by induction on the number of types. 
Base case (k = IType/ = 2): By Lemma 21( 1) it is clear that W2 will not of- 
fer anything more to A than ~2” + Jcgl which will be rejected by A according to 
Lemma 21(2). So if WI will offer something better than SF*’ + Icwz(, A can conclude 
that its type is 1, i.e., nA = 1. But, by (2) of the lemma, it will reject the offer, and in 
the next period will offer WI nothing more than 3”“. Therefore, WI should prefer to 
pretend to be W2. 
Inductive case (k = [Type1 = k’ + 1) : Suppose the induction hypothesis is correct for 
k’ number of types. And suppose another type i’ is added which is weaker than the 
previous types. From the induction hypothesis it is clear that all of them, if they play 
the role of W, will pretend to be strong, therefore if WiT will behave differently, A will 
know who it is, reject its offer, and won’t offer it anything better than Slwif,‘+’ in the 
future. So, if i plays the role of W, it should pretend to be strong. 
(iii) By Lemma 21(3), it is clear that if A will offer sw’*’ in period 1, all the agents 
that are stronger than i will opt out, while the others will accept it. So, A calculates its 
expected utility from all its options, and chooses the best option for itself. 0 
We will now state our final results for this section. 
Theorem 23 (Either an agreement will be reached in the second period, or W will opt 
out). Suppose agent W is of type i E Type and A is of type j E Type, and the agents’ 
utilityfunctions satisfy A&j-&j, $7’ -.?Tt+’ < c,&. Let 2 E Type such that Expect( s^w;,’ ) 
is maximal over any i E Type (where Expect is defined as in Lemma 22( iii) ). 
If both W and A use their sequential equilibrium strategies then in the first period 
(period 0) all types of agents playing the role of W will offer A ?Aw’ + lc~l amount 
of the resource. A will reject the offer. In period 1, A will offer s^w;*l. If W is at least of 
type 1 it will accept the offer. Otherwise, it will opt out. 
Proof. Clear by Lemma 22. 0 
We would like to indicate that Aj may revise its beliefs about its opponent’s type after 
each negotiation session. If in the second period, W accepts an offer equal to s1:“, A 
concludes that W is at most of type i. If A offers $’ and W opts out of the negotiation 
A concludes that it is of type greater than i. Using this additional information about W, 
agent A can update its beliefs about other agents. For example, if A knows that there 
is at most one agent in the system that is of type 1, and it finds out that its opponent 
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from the previous interaction is of type 1, then it can adjust its beliefs about the types 
of other agents. The updated belief will be used in future interactions. 
This is the only case, among the ones that we have studied, in which one of the 
agents may opt out. However, as more interactions occur, more information about one 
another is collected, and less opting out will occur in the future. 
Example 24. We return to the example of the mission to Mars. Suppose that each of 
the labs (agents) on Mars does not know the exact details of the contracts the other 
has with companies. There are two possibilities for the contracts: high (h) and low (1). 
If the type of contracts the German’s hold is h, then their utility functions are similar 
to those of Example 16. They gain $5000 per minute during the negotiation and gain 
$1000 per minute when they share the line with the US. If the US also holds contracts 
of type h, then their utility functions are also similar to those of Example 16. The 
US loses $3000 per minute during the negotiation period and gains $1000 per minute 
when sharing the line with the Germans. If the US opts out the overall US gain will be 
$550,000, but they will also lose $1000 per minute during the negotiation. 
However, if the German contracts are of type 1, then they only gain $4000 per minute 
while using the line by themselves. The US losses while negotiating if their contracts 
are type I are only $2000 per minute. But if the US opts out, their overall gain is only 
$450,000. They still negotiate for the usage of the German line in the next 24 hours 
(i.e., M = 1440) from the time the negotiation ends. 
Formally, let s E S, t E 7, 
@“((s,t)) = 1000s,f50OOt, P((s,t)) = 1000s,+40OOt, 
lJRk ( (Opt,, t) ) = 5000t, Ug’( (Opt,, t)) = 4ooot, 
U”” ( (Opt,, t) > = 5000t - 1000, CP (( Opt,, t)) = 40t - 1000, 
UUk ( (s, t) ) = lOOos, - 3000t, v ( (s, t) ) = lOOOs, - 2000t, 
UUh ((Opt,, t)) = 550000 - lOOOt, U”‘( (Opt,, t)) = 450000 - 1OOOt, 
IP((Optg,t)) = -lOOOt, UU’ ( (Opt,, t) ) = - 10OOt, 
Pf = (889 - 2t, 551 + 2t), s ““J = (989 - t, 45 1 + t) . 
Let us assume that Germany (playing the role of A) is of type h and the US (playing 
the role of W) is of type 1. We denote them by gh and ~1. We will consider two 
cases. Suppose gh believes that with probability 0.5 its opponent is of type h and 
with probability 0.5 its opponent is of type 1, i.e., 4: = 0.5 and 4: = 0.5. According 
to Theorem 23, in the first period, UI will pretend to be of type h and will offer gh 
( V + Ic,,, 1, sp’ - Ic,,~() = (890,550). gh will reject the offer. In the second time 
period, gh compares between offering W (887,553), which will be accepted by both 
types, and offering (988,452) which will be accepted by type 1, but after such an offer, 
if W is of type h, it will opt out. Since its expected utility from offering (887,553) is 
higher, it makes this offer which is accepted by ~1. 
However, suppose g/, believes only with probability 0.1 its opponent is of type h, and 
with probability 0.9 its opponent is of type 1. The behavior of ~1 in the first period is 
similar to the previous case. It pretends to be h. However, in the second period, gh’s 
expected utility from (988,452), is higher than (887,553) and therefore it makes this 
offer to W, which is accepted by ul. 
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7. Negotiation mechanism for multiple fully informed agents 
Up to this point we have assumed that only two agents participate in each interaction 
(assumption ( 1 ), Bilateral Negotiation, in Section 2). We will now relax this assumption 
by extending the framework of Section 4. We note that we assume in this section that 
the agents have full information. 
We assume that a set of agents wants to satisfy a goal. All agents can take part 
in satisfying the goal, but they all need to agree on the schedule. There are no side- 
payments, i.e., no private deals can be reached among the agents. An additional option 
which we do not deal with in this paper involves one of the agents opting out, and the 
remaining agents reaching an agreement. In the rest of the section when we mention 
several agents we mean more than two. 
Example 25. We return to the example of the newsletter deliverers. Here there are 
several electronic newsletters (more than two), that are delivered by separate delivery 
service agents. The delivery is done by phone (either by fax machines or electronic 
mail). The expenses of the agents depend only on the number of phone calls. There are 
several subscribers that subscribe to all the newsletters. All the delivery agents negotiate 
over the distribution of the common subscriptions. Each of the agents can opt out of 
the negotiations and deliver all of its own newsletters by itself. The agents are paid 
according to the time of the delivery (the faster the better). 
As in previous sections, we denote the set of agents by A. We denote the number of 
agents (i.e., (Al) by n and we attach to each agent an integer between 1 and IZ. 
Definition 26 (Agreement). An agreement is a tuple (st , . . . , s,), where Si E N and 
st + . . . + s, = M. si is agent i’s portion of the work. 21 
We will now modify the negotiation procedure to fit the multi-agent interaction. As in 
previous sections, the agents can take actions only at certain times in 7. In each period 
t E 7 one of the agents, say i, proposes an agreement to all the other agents. Each of 
the agents either accepts the offer (chooses Yes) or rejects it (chooses No), or opts 
out of the negotiation (chooses Opt). If the offer is accepted by all the agents, then 
the negotiation ends and the agreement is implemented. Also, opting out by one of the 
agents ends the negotiations. After a rejection by at least one agent, another agent must 
make a counter offer, and so on. That is, this mechanism provides each of the agents 
with a veto power on the agreements that will be reached. However, we will show that 
even under this extreme assumption, agreement is guaranteed in the first time period. 
We require that the agents always make offers in the same order, i.e., if IAl = n 
the first agent makes offers in time periods 0, rr, 2n,. _ ., the second agent makes offers 
in periods 1, n + 1,. . ., etc. We do not make any assumption about who begins the 
negotiations, i.e., who makes the first offer and who is the second agent to make an 
offer. So, without loss of generality we assume that the agents are numbered according 
*’ A similar definition can be given concerning a division of resources. 
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to the order in which they make the offers, i.e., the first agent is denoted by 1, the 
second by 2, etc. 
Definition 27 (Negotiation strategies). A strategy is a sequence of functions. The do- 
main of the ith element of a strategy is a sequence of agreements of length i and its 
range is the set {Yes, No, Opt} U S. We first define a strategy f for an agent i which is 
the first agent to make an offer. 
Let f = {f’}g, where fo E S, for t = kn, k E 7 f’ : S’ + S, and for other t E I, 
f’ : S’ x S --+ {Yes, No, Opt.} We denote by F the set of all strategies of the agent 
who starts the bargaining. 
Similarly, the strategies for the other agents are defined. 
7.1. Attributes of the utility functions 
We will now modify the assumptions of the previous sections to fit the multi-agent 
situation. We note that we are dealing with the task distribution case. 
A17 (Actions are costly). For all t E 7, Y, s E S and i, j E d, i # j: ri > si + 
U’( (r, t)) < U’( (s, t)). For agreements that are reached within the same time period 
each agent prefers to perform a smaller portion of the labor. 
However, the utilities of the agents from agreements in which their parts are equivalent 
may be different. That is, ri = si f, U’( (ri, t) ) = U’( (si, t) ) . Other parameters, such as 
the quality of the performance of the other agents, may also play a role. 
We first consider the case that all agents lose over time. Assumption A2 of Sections 3 
and 4 is still valid. That is: 
A27 (Time is valuable). For any tl,t2 E 7, s E S and i E A, if tl < t2, U’((s,tl)) 2 
Ui((s,t2)) and Ui((Opt,tl)) 2 Ui((Opt,t2)). 
Assumption A3 of Section 3 and Section 4 is not valid. 
We also need to modify the definition of ?,r in order to be able to compare between 
agreements and opting out. 
Definition 28 (Agreements hat are preferred over opting out). For every t E ‘I- and 
i E A we define ,?i’ = {s / s E S s.t. U”( (s, t)) > U’( (Opt, t))}. We denote by 5’ the 
set of agreements that are preferred by all agents over opting out, i.e., s’ = ni,, ji’ 
Suppose all agents are losing over time. We assume that all agents prefer to reach 
a given agreement sooner rather than later, i.e., assumption A2 is still valid. We also 
assume that all agents prefer to opt out sooner rather than later, that is assumption A4 
is valid. We also assume that if an agent prefers an agreement over opting out in some 
period t, then it prefers the same agreement in time period t’ prior to t over opting out 
in t’. Formally: 
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A47 (Opting out costs over time). For tl, t2 E 7 and i E A, if tl < t2 then 
U’((opt,tl)) > Ui((Opt,t2)). If U’((s,t)) > U’((Opt,t)), then for any t’ E 7 
such that t’ < t, U’((s,t’)> > U’((Opt,t’)). If U’((s,t)) > U’((Opt,r+ I)), then 
forany t’E7suchthat t’<t, U’((s,t’)) >U’((Opt,t’+l)). 
It is clear that under this assumption, for any t E 7, niEA sit+’ C niEA &. 
We will concentrate on the cases where there is an agreement in the first time period 
which is acceptable to all agents and that there is a time period where there is no 
agreement that all agents prefer over opting out. This is stated in the next assumption. 
A57 (Possible agreements). n,, jio # 0. There exists T E 7 such that ST = 8. We 
denote the minimal time period among these time periods by p. 
7.2. Agreement is guaranteed with no delay 
We are able to show that the results of Section 4 are also valid when there are more 
than two agents in the environment and when all agents have veto power. As in the 
bilateral case, if the agents use perfect equilibrium strategies, agreement will be reached 
without any delay. The main driving force of the agent reaching agreement in this 
case is the cost of the negotiation time. The agents’ attitudes toward opting out versus 
agreements will only affect the details of the actual agreement hat will be reached, but 
won’t drive any of the agents to opt out. 
We will first show that in such a case if the game has not ended in prior periods, then 
an agreement will be reached in the period prior to that in which there is no agreement 
acceptable to all agents, i.e., in period ? - 1. 
Lemma 29 (Agreement will be reached prior to the time period when agreement is no 
longer possible (N-agent version) ) . Suppose the model satisfies A&-A27 and A+A57. 
If the agents are using their perfect equilibrium strategies, and the negotiation process 
is not over until time p - 1 and it is agent i’s turn To make an ofeel; then it will offer 
s’ = maxLit ST-’ and all the other agents will accept he offer. 22 
Proof. In period p and later, there is no agreement that is acceptable to all the agents. 
Therefore, the only possible outcome after that time period is either opting out or 
disagreement. Since disagreement is the worst outcome (A&) and the agents prefer 
opting out sooner rather than later, at least one of the agents will opt out at time period 
‘* For simplification, we will assume that only one such maximal agreement exists. This will be the case 
either if the only factor determining the utility for an agent is its own portion of the task (see Example 34). 
or if the quality of the performance of the other agents yields a different utility for each agreement. Without 
this uniqueness assumption, if there are several agreements which have the same maximal utility for agent i, it 
is difficult for the other agents to predict which offer agent i will make. These agreements may have different 
utilities to the other agents. We can assume that in such situations, agent i chooses any one of the maximal 
agreements with equal probability, and that the other agents behave according to their expected utilities. 
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If. But all the agents prefer an agreement from ST-’ over opting out in the next period. 
Since it is i’s turn, it can choose the best agreement from its point of view, offer it, and 
all the agents will accept it. •i 
Now, we will show that in each time period less than ? there is always a set of 
possible agreements, acceptable to all the agents. The agent whose turn it is to make an 
offer, should choose the best of these agreements according to its utility function and 
make this offer. 
We first define the sets of acceptable agreements by induction of ?. In the period 
before p, this set contains only s^. In the prior period ? - 2 it includes all the agreements 
that are preferred in this time period by all agents over opting out and over 3 in p - 1. 
From this set the best agreement for the agent whose turn it is to make an offer is 
chosen. In computing the acceptable agreements set in the prior period f - 3 this value 
is used as the basis, similar to s^ before, i.e. the acceptable agreements in ? - 3 are those 
that are better to the agents than this value and also better than opting out. Similarly for 
prior periods. 
Definition 30 (Acceptable agreements). Let x’-’ = s^ (where s^ is as defined in 
Lemma 29). For each t E 7, t < rf‘ - 1, let X’ include all the agreements that satisfy the 
followingcondition:sEX’iffsES’andforanyjEd,Uj((s,t)) >Uj((x’+‘,t+l)). 
If it is i’s turn to make an offer in time period t, we define x’ = maxD X’. 
This definition is sound, since X’ is not empty for any time period before f - 1. We 
will prove this in the next lemma. The intuition behind the proof is that CC’+’ always 
belongs to X’, since the agents lose over time, and if an agreement is preferred over 
opting out, at a given time period, it is also preferred over opting out in previous time 
periods. 
Lemma 31 (Acceptable agreements do exists). If the model satisjies conditions A07- 
A27 and A47-A57 then for t E 7, t < f - 1, X’ # 8. 
Proof. We will show by backward induction on t that for all t < p - 1, X’ # 8. 
Basecuse(t=?-2):ByA27ViEd, U’((?,?-2))>U’((?,?--1)) andby 
A47 it is clear that U’((s^,f-2)) > U’((Opt,f-2)), and therefore $ E XT-*. 
Inductive cuse (t < p - 2): By the induction hypothesis, X’+’ # 8. Therefore, x”’ 
is well defined. But, by A27 and A47, similarly to the base case, it is easy to see that 
Xffl E X’. cl 
We will show now that in any time period all the agents will accept ~8, and the agent 
whose turn it is to make an offer will also offer x’. The intuition behind this is that x’ 
is preferred by the agents over opting out, and it is better than any agreement that can 
be reached in the future. 
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Lemma 32 (x1 is offered and accepted). If the model satisfies conditions AOl-A27 and 
A+A57 then in any time period t < f - 1, the agents will accept any offer s E X’ and 
the agent whose turn it is to make an offer will offer xt. 
Proof. The proof is by backward induction of t. 
Base case (t = f - 2): By Lemma-29, it is clear that the agents won’t reach any 
agreement in the future better than x r-l. However, by the definition of X’ (Defini- 
tion 30), any agreement in XPP2 is better for the agents than ,r-’ in time period ? - 1, 
and than opting out at p - 2. Therefore, they should accept these offers. 
On the other hand, any agreement that does not belong to Xfw2 won’t be accepted 
by at least one of the agents, since it will prefer to wait another period and receive 3 
or even opt out. But since i, similar to the other agents, prefers the agreements of XTP2 
over this possibility, it should offer an agreement from this set. However, since it is its 
turn to make an offer, it has the opportunity to choose the best one from its point of 
view. 
Inductive case ( t < f - 2) : By the induction hypothesis, if an agreement isn’t reached 
in this time period, the outcome of the negotiation process will be (xl+’ ,t + 1). But, 
the agreements of X’ at time period t are preferred by all agents over ( .rt+‘, t + 1) and 
over opting out at t; the proof proceeds as in the base case. 0 
We summarize our results by the following theorem. 
Theorem 33. If the model satisfies conditions A01-A27 and A+A57, ana’ the agents 
use their perfect equilibrium strategies, then in the first time period agent 1 will offer 
x0, and all other agents will accept the offer. 
Proof. Clear, by Lemma 32. 0 
Example 34. We return to the example of the newsletter deliverers. Three electronic 
newsletters (NJ, N2 and Ns) are delivered by separate delivery services (Di, D2 and 
03). The payment arrangements for DI and D2 are as previously discussed in ex- 
ample 14, i.e., the publisher of Nt pays D1 $200 per delivery of one edition, and 
the publisher of N2 pays 02 $225 per delivery of one edition. The publisher of 
Ns pays 03 $250 per delivery of one edition. As was the case for D1 and D2, 
each delivery to a given subscriber (i.e., a phone call to this subscriber’s server) 
also costs Ds $1, and each loses $1 for each time period. There are M subscribers 
with subscriptions to all newsletters (i.e., Ni, N2 and Ns), and as in example 14 
there are substantial savings to a delivery service if one of the agents can deliver 
all newsletters to the same subscribers. If an agreement among Dl, D2 and 03 for 
joint deliveries to the M joint subscribers is reached, then the publisher of Ns will 
pay D3 only $215 per delivery of an edition, and as in the previous example, in 
such an event the publisher of Ni will pay D1 $170, and the publisher of N2 will 
pay D2 $200. They must still pay $1 per phone call to the server, and will lose 
$2 for any negotiation time period. Notice that in this example, only the number 
of phone calls to the subscribers made by a delivery agent plays a role in its pay- 
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Summary of results. t of column 6 is the earliest time period, in which there is no agreement preferred by 
both agents over opting out. ci of column 7 is the constant cost of delay. ZiJ is the worst agreement for agent 
i in a given period t which is still preferable to i than opting out in time period t. .KO of row 7 in column 8 is 
defined in Definition 15. Expect is defined in Lemma 6 
Type & 
Section 
Opting Number Full Who ? C, ?Q Results 
out of agents info loses 
Resource 3 No 2 Yes Both - c, > Q 
Resource 3 No 2 Yes Both - cl < c2 
Task 4 Yes 2 Yes Both even - 
Task 4 Yes 2 Yes Both odd - 
Resource 5 Yes 2 Yes I (w) - lcwl 5 CA 
Resource 5 Yes 2 Yes 1 (w) - lcwl 2 CA 
Task 7 Yes N>2 Yes all 
Resource 6 Yes 2 No 1 (w) = ;wi <CA 
((l>O),O) 
((c2.1 - C2)TO) 
((p _ pc2+ (if- I)q, 
s2 *‘T--l +  $2 - (if - l)C’),O) 
((.$.‘_’ - f(C 1)ca + +(f - l)C’, 
3Y-l + ;(f - l)c2 - @- l)C’),O) 
(SK’, 1) 
((Z’ + 1 + CA, 3:’ - 1 -cA),o) 
(nO;‘O) ” 
(S ?3’, 1) where Expect( c?~;,~) 
is maximal 
OR W opts out in period 1 
ments and not the distribution of the rest of the subscribers between the other two 
agents. 
Formally, 
U’((Opt,t)) =200-M-t, U’((s,t>)=170-s, -2t, 
U2((Opt,t)) =225-M-t, U*((S,t))=200-s*-2t, 
U3((0pt,t))=250-M-t, U3((S,t))=215-ss-2t. 
Suppose M = 100. Then ii,’ = 69 - t Z*,’ = 74 - t, and S^3,t - 64 - t. Note that for all ’ 2 3 - 
i E { 1,2,3}, Zi*’ is not unique in this case. 
? = 36 and it is Ds’s turn to make an offer in the time period prior to ?. In this 
period, D1 is willing to deliver up to 34 newsletters, if an agreement will be reached 
Al.35 (i.e., sr = 34) and D2 is willing to deliver up to 39 newsletters (i.e., s”i’35 = 39). 
So, x35 = (34,39,27). It is easy to compute, that whenever it is DI’S turn to make 
an offer (t is divided by 3), XI= (31,38,31), when it is D2’s turn to make an offer, 
xt = (35,36,29) and when it is Ds’s turn to make an offer (prior to time period 35), 
xr = (33,40,27). Therefore, in the first time period (0), DI will offer (31,38,31), and 
its opponents will accept its offer. 
8. Evaluation of the results 
We will analyze the results of the paper using the criteria of Section 1.3. A summary 
of the results appears in Table 7.2. 
l Distributed. In all the situations we analyzed there is no central unit that is involved 
in the inter-agent encounters. The agents negotiate to reach an agreement. 
l Instantaneously. Conflict are resolved without delay. In most of the situations we 
dealt with, an agreement will be reached in the first time period. This includes 
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the situations of Sections 3 and 4 where two agents negotiate and both are losing 
over time, and the situations of Section 7 where there are multiple agents that 
negotiate and all of them are losing over time. However, also when one of the 
agents is gaining over time (Section 5), but the loser W loses more than the gainer 
(A) gains over time, agreement will be reached in the first period. In the second 
case of Section 5, when W loses less than A gains (which is the more common 
situation), agreement will be reached in the second period. Similarly, even if there 
is incomplete information (Section 6) the negotiation will end at the second period. 
l EfJiciency. In almost all the cases that we analyzed, the agents reach an agreement 
and conflict is avoided. Furthermore, in the cases of task distribution (Sections 4 
and 6) and in the cases where the resource is not in use during the negotiation 
process (Sections 3)) agreement will be reached in the first period. So, in the case 
of two agents that are waiting for the resource, since agreement will be reached in 
the first period, there won’t be a deadlock. 
The only situation where the negotiation process may end up with an agent opting 
out, is in the case of incomplete information (Section 6). Also in this situation, 
in most of the cases the negotiation process will also end with an agreement, but 
in some cases it will end with W opting out. This depends on the accuracy of 
A’s beliefs about its opponent and A’s utility from opting out versus reaching an 
agreement. However, after each negotiation interaction, A may learn more about 
its opponent’s type and update its belief. The beliefs of the agents about the types 
of other agents become more and more accurate with each interaction. Therefore 
the probability that the resource will be damaged is decreasing over time and the 
efJiciency of the system is increasing. 
In most of the cases we dealt with, the agreement that is reached is Pareto 
optimal. That is, there is no other agreement that all the agents prefer over the 
one that they reached. However, in the case of resource allocation (Sections 5 and 
6) where the agent that loses over time loses less than the agent that gains over 
time, the agreement hat is reached is not always Pareto-optimal. If A’s share in the 
agreement is big enough, there are some agreements in the future that both agents 
prefer over the one that they reached. However, since A gains over time, it prefers 
to delay reaching an agreement as long as possible. Therefore, even if it promises 
W to give it a better offer in the future, when the time comes, it is not rational for 
A to keep its promise. A would rather wait another time period. Knowing that, W 
accepts a lower offer and an agreement is reached in the second period. So, even 
though the agreement is not Pareto-optimal, the advantage of the solution is that 
an agreement is reached without a big delay, even though one of the agents gains 
over time. In that time period, there is no other agreement hat is preferred by both 
agents. 
l Simplicity. The strategies are simple and depend only on the current period. In 
the next section we will explain how these strategies can be implemented in an 
automated negotiator. 
l Symmetry. The negotiation mechanism is sensitive to agent’s roles (A or W), but 
not to their identity and types. The agents’ type and identity only influence the 
other’s private negotiation strategy. 
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l Stability. In all the situations that we considered we found subgame-perfect equi- 
librium or sequential equilibriums. 
l Satisjiability or accessibility. In all the cases of task distribution that we considered 
the task will be performed. When we consider the resource allocation problem, 
there are some situations where an agent won’t get the resource immediately. The 
first one is in the case of incomplete information, when one of the agents opts out. 
We assume that after the resource is repaired, both agents have some probability of 
getting access to the resource. The second case was described in Section 3. Here, 
if the agent’s utility functions include a constant cost of delay, and ct < cz in the 
agreement that will be reached, the first agent will get all the resource. This is 
due to the structure of the situation, and giving up the usage of the resource is the 
second agent’s preference. 
9. Complexity and implementation 
We are in the process of implementing an automated negotiator that will participate in 
negotiation situations characterized by time constraints. It will be based on the theoretical 
results of this paper. We will report on the implementation issues in a different paper, 
but we discuss here some important related questions. 
We have suggested that autonomous agents will use equilibrium strategies for the 
negotiation. Such strategies are stable since no designer will benefit by building an 
agent that uses any other strategy when it is known that the other agents are using 
equilibrium strategies. 
There are two approaches to finding equilibria. One is the straight game theory 
approach: search for Nash or perfect or sequential strategies. The other is the economist’s 
standard approach: set up a maximization problem and solve using calculus [ 431. The 
maximization approach is straightforward and if the utility functions of the agents are 
chosen correctly, the maximization problem can be solved using some well known 
techniques of linear programming (e.g., [ 551). However, when applied to situations 
such as ours, the maximization technique is less appropriate because the agents must 
solve their optimization problems jointly: A’s strategy affects W’s maximization problem 
and vice versa. 
The drawback of the game theory approach is that finding equilibrium strategies is 
not mechanical: an agent must somehow make a guess that some strategy combination 
is in equilibrium before it tests it. There is no general way to make the initial guess. 
In situations of multistage negotiations (or games in general) strategies can be found 
by trying to “guess” the set of actions that are used with positive probability in each 
state of the game. Working with this guess an agent can either construct a sequential 
equilibrium or show that none exists with this guess and go on and try another guess. 
If there is a point where it is clear that the negotiation will end it is often best to work 
through problems like this backward. 
In our negotiation protocol there are A4 A-1 /( IAl - 1) ! possible offers the offering 
agent can make (i.e., the number of possible agreements) and 31a] possible combinations 
of actions with which the other agents can respond. If we assume that there is some 
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time period f after which no agreement can be reached (e.g., W will prefer opting 
out to agreement), the overall number of pure strategies is 0( (Mldl-t/( JAI - 1) !>r). 
However, if there is no such ? then the number of pure strategies (in theory) can be 
infinite. 
If we consider cases of incomplete information the problem becomes even harder. In 
addition to guesses of the actions, there should be a construction of the agents’ beliefs 
in each state of the negotiation. This can be done by stating a set of inequalities which 
are the constraints on the beliefs in each state. 
In general, it is too time consuming to compute the strategies in real time. Therefore, 
we suggest that equilibrium strategies be identified before the negotiation process starts. 
In this paper we presented appropriate strategies for varied situations. The situations are 
characterized by several environmental factors (e.g., number of agents, purpose of the 
negotiation) and the agents’ utility functions. 
If the automated agents act in a static environment, the appropriate strategy can be 
precomputed by the designer of the agent and inserted into its database. If the agents 
are active in a dynamic environment we are in the process of developing a library 
of frame-strategies that consists of the strategies that are appropriate for the different 
situations the automated negotiator may participate in. When the automated negotiator 
acts in one of these situations it will choose the frame-strategy that is appropriate for 
its current situation, initialize the appropriate variables (e.g., ?wlV’, CA), and negotiate 
according to this strategy. 
In general, the automated negotiator will be composed of three modules: the Meta- 
Strategies Library, the Identifier and the Controller (see Fig. 1). 
A meta-strategy is a frame strategy that includes several parameters. We note that 
in each of the negotiation situations that we have investigated until now, the perfect 
equilibrium strategies are determined by parameters of the situation. For example, in the 
case in which the agents can opt out and they have constant delays (ci), the strategies 
depend on the constant delays and the worst agreement for an agent which is still 
better for it than opting out in period 1 (slip’). We use these parameters to construct the 
meta-strategies. 
The Identifier will depend on the environment, and its purpose is to identify the 
special parameters of the environment (see [ 481) . The Controller will find the correct 
meta-strategy in the library, convert the meta-strategy into a strategy by initiating its 
parameters, and operate it. 
So, in general, when the agent participates in any of the negotiation situations that we 
have considered, the Identifier will recognize the parameters of the situation (or they 
will be given to the agent), and the Controller will construct the exact strategy for the 
specific case and use it in the negotiations. Since we provide the agents with unique 
perfect equilibrium strategies, if we announce it to the other agents in the environment, 
the other agents cannot do better than to use their similar strategies. Since both the Meta- 
Strategies Library and the Controller are domain independent, the automated negotiator 
can be used in a variety of different applications, simply by changing the Identifier. 
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Meta-Strategies 
Library 
Specification 1: 
Cl <Q... 
;, >c2_.k lq? 
Specification 2: 
Messages 
Fig. I. General structure of the automated negotiator. The Identifier is responsible for determining the specific 
arguments of the situation. The Controller should choose a strategy from the Meta-Strategies’ Library, accord- 
ing to the parameters. Then the Controller will operate according to the strategy and will send messages to 
other agents and receive messages from other agents. 
10. Conclusion 
This paper has been concerned with how automated agents can be designed to interact 
effectively in both resource allocation and task distribution environments. A strategic 
model of negotiation has been proposed as a way of reaching mutual benefit while 
avoiding costly and time consuming interactions which might increase the overhead of 
coordination. That is, we have provided a model in which agents can avoid spending too 
much time negotiating an agreement and therefore are better able to stick to a timetable 
for satisfying their goals. 
In the process of developing and specifying the strategic model of negotiation, we 
have examined single as well as multi-agent environments, situations characterized by 
complete as well as incomplete information, and the differing impact of time on the 
payoffs of the participants. While some combinations of these factors can result in minor 
delays, the model nevertheless reveals an important capacity for reaching agreement in 
early periods of the negotiation. 
Throughout the paper, we have referred to two examples of application of the strategic 
model to problems in distributed artificial intelligence (DAI) . The resource allocation 
problem has been examined through the development of a scenario in which agents must 
share a resource in order to achieve their separate goals. The task distribution problem 
has been examined via a scenario in which savings can result from the sharing of tasks, 
and both parties benefit from cooperation. In both cases, we have met the criteria for 
the evaluation of a negotiation protocol which we proposed at the outset of the paper: 
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symmetrical distribution (no central unit or agent), efficiency (conflict avoided and no 
deadlocks in outcome), simplicity (process simple and efficient), stability (distinguish- 
able equilibrium point), and satisfiability or accessibility (access to the resource or task 
completed). 
We have ended with a brief discussion of the general structure of an automated 
negotiator, to be based on the theoretical results of this paper. The functioning of the 
automated negotiator will depend upon whether it will be operating in a static or dynamic 
environment. The implementation of a prototype automated negotiator will provide an 
environment in which experimental work on the strategic model under varying initial 
assumptions can be undertaken, as well as one in which human negotiators can be 
trained. 
We believe that our model can be useful in other situations beside the ones we an- 
alyzed in the paper. For example, situations where there are several resources in the 
environment, or task distribution situations where the agents have incomplete informa- 
tion. We leave this for future work. 
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